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Abstract 
We estimate the effect of welfare reform on the intergenerational transmission of welfare 
participation using a long panel of mother-daughter pairs over the survey period 1968-
2013 in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. Because states implemented welfare 
reform at different times starting in 1992, the cross-state variation over time permits us to 
quasi-experimentally separate out the effect of mothers’ participation on daughters’ 
welfare choice in the pre- and post-welfare reform periods. Our empirical framework also 
addresses potential issues in identifying a causal pathway from parent to child that arise 
from correlated unobservables in welfare decisions, misclassification error in survey 
reports, life-cycle differences in measuring the parent and child’s age of welfare usage, 
and cross-state mobility. We find that a mother’s welfare participation increased her 
daughter’s odds of participation as an adult by around 25 to 35 percentage points, but that 
welfare reform attenuated this transmission by at least 50 percent, or at least 30 percent 
over the baseline odds of participation. However, when we broaden the definition of 
welfare received by the daughter to also include assistance from means-tested food or 
disability assistance, then the transmission from mother to daughter does not decrease 
after welfare reform. This seems to be a consequence of persistence in intergenerational 
poverty status. 
 
1 
 
I. Introduction 
A fundamental goal of the landmark 1996 welfare reform in the United States was to 
eliminate the dependence of needy families on government assistance. This was premised in part 
on the belief that dependence is passed down from parent to child through knowledge and values, 
creating a “culture of welfare” across generations (Murray 1984; DeParle 2004; Haskins 2007). 
While this belief was bolstered by an empirical consensus documenting a positive 
intergenerational correlation of welfare use, the literature is much less settled on whether the 
relationship is causal (Duncan, Hill, and Hoffman 1988; McLanahan 1988; Solon, et al. 1988; 
Gottschalk 1990, 1992, 1996; Levine and Zimmerman 1996; Borjas and Sueyoshi 1997; Pepper 
2000; Page 2004; Dahl, Kostøl, and Mogstad 2014). Instead, the parent-child link in welfare 
participation could simply be a spurious by-product of incomes that are correlated across 
generations. That is, low economic mobility across generations means that children of parents 
with low incomes likely have low incomes themselves in adulthood, and both generations 
participate in means-tested programs solely because of their shared poverty status and not 
welfare exposure per se. If true, then we would not expect generational welfare participation to 
fall after reform unless poverty among the young declined.  
In this paper, we investigate the effect of welfare reform on the intergenerational 
transmission of welfare participation. We identify changes of welfare use from parent to child 
across regimes by exploiting the quasi-experimental variation provided by the 1990s reforms to 
the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program in the United States. AFDC was 
established during the Great Depression and was the main cash transfer program for families 
with dependent children. Conditional on low income and assets, along with the presence of 
children under age 18, eligibility for assistance was an entitlement. Starting in 1992, states began 
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implementing substantive changes to their AFDC programs with waivers from federal rules, and 
by 1996, 43 states had implemented some form of waiver affecting program features such as new 
work requirements, time limits on length of receipt, and caps on benefit generosity. These 
waivers culminated with passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act of 1996, which replaced AFDC with the non-entitlement federal block grant 
program Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). Scores of papers have been written 
evaluating welfare reform (see surveys in Blank 2002; Moffitt 2003; Grogger and Karoly 2005; 
Ziliak 2016), but what is not known is whether it achieved a key aim of ending the transmission 
of welfare across generations. 
 To estimate the effect of welfare reform on the intergenerational transmission of welfare 
participation, we assemble a long panel of mother-daughter pairs over the survey period 1968-
2013 in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). We focus on mother-daughter pairs 
because over 90 percent of AFDC cases were headed by a single mother, and there has been a 
large secular increase since the 1960s in the fraction of first births to unmarried women in the 
U.S. from fewer than 1 in 10 to over 4 in 10 such that more than one third of U.S. children were 
exposed to welfare by age 10 (Levine and Zimmerman 2005; Cancian and Reed 2009). Our 
empirical framework augments a canonical transmission model whereby the welfare 
participation of the daughter during adulthood is regressed on the prior welfare participation of 
the mother with a difference-in-difference-type specification that includes a variable reflecting 
the implementation of welfare reform in the mother’s state and the interaction of the welfare-
reform variable with mother’s participation. Because states implemented reforms at different 
times starting in 1992, the variation across states over time permits us to separate out the effect 
of mothers’ participation in the pre- and post-welfare reform periods. 
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Even though welfare reform provides exogenous variation in access to program benefits 
across welfare eras, identifying whether there is a causal pathway from parent to child in welfare 
use within periods is complicated by four—potentially reinforcing—forms of bias. First, 
selection bias in welfare participation across generations can arise through possible unobserved 
correlations in labor market productivity between the parent and child, perhaps because of latent 
shared cognitive or noncognitive skills, or shared tastes for welfare relative to work (Solon, et al. 
1988; Gottschalk 1992, 1996; Pepper 2000). The second threat to identification comes from 
potential misclassification bias in survey responses (Bollinger and David 1997, 2001; Hausman, 
Abrevaya, and Scott-Morton 1998; Kreider, et al. 2012; Meyer and Mittag 2014). In transfer 
programs, this nonclassical measurement error mostly comes in the form of “false negatives” 
when the respondent states they did not participate in a program when in fact they did. Meyer, 
Mok, and Sullivan (2015a,b) document a trend increase in misreporting across all major 
household surveys in the U.S., including the PSID. Third, so-called life-cycle bias and the 
‘windows problem’ may affect intergenerational estimates of economic status because we 
generally only observe snapshots of a parent and child and not their full life cycles (Wolfe, et al. 
1996; Page 2004; Haider and Solon 2006; Nybom and Stuhler 2016). In the welfare context, this 
form of bias may exacerbate or attenuate intergenerational transmission estimates depending on 
whether the window of parent-child observations is dominated by families in the midst of long-
term welfare spells. Fourth, there could be bias in the transmission estimates if the daughter 
moves across states as an endogenous response to the generosity of the state’s welfare system 
(Levine and Zimmerman 1999; Gelbach 2004; McKinnish 2007; Kennan and Walker 2010).  
 We address potential endogenous selection into welfare by instrumenting for mother’s 
welfare use. Because selection is likely to be time-varying, we instrument mother’s welfare 
4 
 
participation with the state maximum AFDC/TANF benefit guarantee and the maximum federal 
and state Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) when daughters are ages 12 to 18. These instruments 
are constructed during a daughter’s critical ages of exposure to her mother’s potential welfare, 
which is generally well before she faces a participation decision as an adult. The mother’s 
welfare participation decision is assumed to respond positively to greater state-level 
AFDC/TANF benefit standards, whereas EITC benefits may offer a substitute for AFDC/TANF 
assistance. Fundamentally, these aggregated measures of state-level policies identify the portion 
of a mother’s participation decision that are related to her welfare status separately from 
conditions related to her poverty status, and consequently, her daughter’s future poverty status. 
Next, we address the implications of misclassified welfare participation, which may 
occur in both the dependent variable for daughters as well as the independent variable for 
mothers. Instruments for mother’s participation will partially address misclassification in the 
right-hand-side variable, and we use a relatively long time history to determine whether the 
mother ever participated on welfare in the past, which also should attenuate measurement error 
compared to a contemporaneous measure. We address misclassification bias in the dependent 
variable by parametric methods using “extra-sample” information based on PSID reporting rates 
estimated in Meyer, et al. (2015b). 
We attempt to mitigate the influence of the life-cycle windows problem by using the 
relatively long time series for each mother-daughter pair now available in the PSID. We require 
the mother and daughter to live together at least 5 years during the critical exposure period of 
ages 12-18, and to observe the daughter for at least five years after she forms her own family 
unit. On average, we observe mothers and daughters co-residing for 14 years, and daughters for 
nearly 25 years as head of their own family, and thus we observe the full welfare lifecycle for 
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many mother-daughter pairs. As a sensitivity check, we also estimate a variant of the model with 
the Lee and Solon (2009) age-adjustment in order to re-center the data at a common point in the 
mothers’ and daughters’ life cycles. Lastly, for the issue of cross-state mobility, we examine the 
sensitivity of estimates to possible endogenous migration by examining various subsamples of 
non-movers. 
 Our estimates show that there is strong evidence for a causal transmission of 
AFDC/TANF participation from mother to daughter, and it is economically sizable, on the order 
of 25 to 35 percentage points. However, welfare reform significantly attenuated the level of 
transmission pathway by at least 50 percent, or at least 30 percent over the baseline probability. 
The transmission pathway is stronger for mothers with longer-term dependence as well as for 
black families, and the effects of welfare reform seem more pronounced in states with less-
aggressive reforms possibly indicating that TANF evened the field in terms of state welfare 
stringency. Estimates of the reform effect are robust across a variety of specifications, including 
the length of mother-daughter observation window, the age of welfare exposure by the daughter 
when living at home, life-cycle age adjustments, and misclassification error. However, when we 
broaden the definition of welfare received by the daughter to also include participation in food 
and disability assistance programs, then the transmission from mother to daughter after welfare 
reform does not decrease, likely owing to the persistence in intergenerational poverty status. 
II. Welfare Reform and Intergenerational Transmission 
“Welfare” in the U.S. through the 1980s was largely defined by the AFDC program, 
which was established as part of the Social Security Act of 1935 to assist low-income families 
with children under age 18. Initially, assistance was restricted to the children of destitute widows 
and widowers, and then later was expanded to cover the guardian of the child, and eventually a 
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second parent if present in the household. In well over 90 percent of the cases, the family was 
headed by a single mother. Eligibility for assistance (conditional on the presence of a dependent 
child under age 18) was determined by an income test, a liquid asset test, and a vehicle asset test. 
The federal government set rules on what counted as income or an asset, and also established 
limits on the dollar value of those resources. States did have authority to set maximum benefit 
levels (which increase with family size) and need standards used in assigning income eligibility. 
The program was an entitlement funded by a federal-state matching grant based on state per-
capita income, with the federal government picking up over 60 percent of expenditure on 
average (Ziliak 2016).  
Beginning in the 1960s, states could apply for waivers from federal rules to experiment 
with program features, but with few exceptions, they did not utilize this flexibility, and when 
they did, it was typically for small pilot programs. This changed in the last half of the President 
George H.W. Bush administration when several states filed waiver applications, and then 
accelerated under President Clinton, who had pledged to “end welfare as we know it” as part of 
his 1992 campaign. By 1996, 43 states had waivers approved by the Department of Health and 
Human Services (Grogger and Karoly 2005). The waivers were far reaching, and included both 
strengthening and expanding of pre-existing policies (e.g. work requirements and sanctions on 
benefits for failing to work or participate in a training program introduced as part of the Family 
Support Act of 1988), as well as new policies aimed at family responsibility (e.g. caps on the 
generosity of benefits by family size and time limits on benefit receipt). Some of the new 
policies actually expanded eligibility, such as higher asset limits and earnings disregards for 
benefit determination, but the majority were designed to restrict program access. Time-limit 
waivers in particular were introduced to break long-term spells on AFDC, and in turn to reduce 
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exposure of children to parental use of welfare.  
The state-level waivers were codified into federal law with passage of the Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) in August of 1996. 
PRWORA replaced AFDC with a new program called Temporary Assistance for Needy Families 
(TANF), which is not an entitlement. The new law established federal maximum guidelines 
regarding funding, work requirements, and time limits, but otherwise devolved much more 
program design authority to the states. For example, the federal lifetime time limit for benefits 
for an adult is five years, but nearly half the states opted to impose shorter limits. Nineteen states 
now require some form of mandatory job search at the point of benefit application, and in 
fourteen of those states the sanction for noncompliance is to deny the application. Seventeen 
states have opted to impose a family cap on benefit generosity, and thirty-two states introduced 
“diversion payments” that steer eligible applicants away from the official caseload and instead 
toward a lump-sum payment, typically valued at three months of the maximum benefit for a 
given family size (Ziliak 2016).  
[Figure 1 here] 
Figure 1 depicts trends in the number of persons on AFDC/TANF, spanning the AFDC 
era (1960-1991), the major waiver period (1992-1996 shaded in gray), and the TANF era (from 
1997 onward). Participation accelerated throughout the 1960s from about 3 million persons in 
1960 to 10 million a decade later. The level of recipients remained fairly constant for nearly two 
decades, and then increased by approximately 30 percent from 1989 to 1994. By 2012, however, 
the number of recipients had plummeted 67 percent to levels roughly the same as five decades 
earlier. Numerous studies demonstrated that while the economy accounted for more of the 
decline in welfare in the mid 1990s, welfare waivers also reduced participation, especially in 
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those states adopting more stringent responsibility and time limit policies (Council of Economic 
Advisers 1997; Ziliak et al. 2000; Blank 2001; Grogger 2003). For those few studies that 
examined caseload decline after passage of PRWORA, greater weight was given to policy 
reforms in accounting for the decline in participation compared to the waiver era, though the 
macroeconomy was still the driving force (Grogger and Karoly 2005). The declining 
participation stemmed more from reduced entry onto welfare than from increased exits (Grogger, 
Haider, and Klerman 2003; Haider and Klerman 2005; Frogner, Moffitt, and Ribar 2009).  
Families that received AFDC were categorically eligible for food assistance from the 
Food Stamp Program, which started in 1964 but took nearly a decade to roll out nationwide (and 
was renamed Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) in 2008). Receipt of AFDC 
was not necessary for eligibility for food stamps, but it was sufficient, and typically about 80 to 
90 percent of AFDC recipients took up both (Green Book 1994). This categorical eligibility 
remained after the introduction of TANF. While any given individual on AFDC could not 
simultaneously receive assistance from the disability program Supplemental Security Income 
(SSI), which began in 1972, it was possible for families to combine benefits with some on AFDC 
and some on SSI (and still also qualify for food stamps). These provisions remain after welfare 
reform.  
Figure 1 also presents trends in the number of recipients on food stamps and SSI. There 
was a marked drop in food stamp participation in the immediate aftermath of welfare reform, 
followed by a huge expansion in the subsequent decade. These swings have been attributed to 
changes in the macroeconomy, welfare and food stamp policies, and in program take-up rates 
among those eligible (Ganong and Leibman 2013; Ziliak 2015). There has also been growth in 
SSI, especially after 1990 when the Supreme Court’s Zebley Decision expanded eligibility for 
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children (Kubik 1999), and again after welfare reform where there is some evidence that states 
systematically facilitated the applications of former AFDC recipients for SSI program benefits 
(Schmidt and Sevak 2004). The implication then is that even if welfare reform succeeded in 
breaking the generational cycle on AFDC/TANF, it is not clear a priori that it reduced 
dependence more broadly when additional safety net programs are considered.  
[Figure 2 here] 
As motivating evidence for the role of welfare reform on the intergenerational 
transmission of dependence, Figure 2 presents the correlation between mother’s and daughter’s 
welfare participation for rolling cohorts of daughters over time based on the PSID. No attempt is 
made here to separate out cause and effect, only correlations over time in order to illustrate the 
trend and to anchor our estimates to those in the prior literature as summarized in Page (2004).1 
Figure 2 shows that the intergenerational correlation in welfare increased throughout the two 
decades leading up to the passage of welfare reform, and indeed did not peak until 1998 when 
the correlation of 0.40 was more than double that of the late 1970s. The correlation between 
mothers’ and daughters’ AFDC/TANF use then fell precipitously afterwards to levels 
comparable to those in the early 1980s. However, if we expand the definition of daughter’s 
welfare to include food stamps or SSI (mother’s welfare remains defined by AFDC/TANF use), 
then we see a very different pattern. The intergenerational correlation is relatively constant after 
                                                            
1 Specifically, across rolling cohorts of mother-daughter pairs in each year we estimate 𝑊𝑖𝑡
𝑑 = 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡𝑊𝑖𝑡
𝑚 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡
𝑑  
where 𝑊𝑖𝑡
𝑑 and 𝑊𝑖𝑡
𝑚 are the daughter’s and mother’s welfare indicators, respectively, 𝛿𝑡 is the year-specific 
intergenerational correlation in welfare use, and 𝜖𝑖𝑡
𝑑  is the error term. In order to make our estimates comparable to 
Page (2004), we use daughter’s PSID core longitudinal weights at age 25 in estimation, and we temporarily define 
our sample and measures of welfare participation for the purposes of Figure 2. For each year t, our sample consists 
of daughters ages 27-42 years old who are the heads of their family unit and the dependent variable is an indicator 
for any welfare use by the daughter between ages 14 and 27. The independent variable is an indicator for mother’s 
welfare use prior to the daughter’s matriculation to family headship.  
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welfare reform. The descriptive evidence thus points to the possibility that welfare reform 
succeeded in reducing the transmission of AFDC/TANF use across generations, but dependence 
more broadly defined has not changed.  
To identify the intergenerational dependence parameter, one naturally has to separate the 
poverty trap from the welfare trap. The correlations presented in Figure 2 can simply reflect 
persistence in poverty status, and thus, the evidence does not imply that welfare generated 
dependence on government assistance transmitted from mother to daughter. The literature, 
however, has elaborated on potential mechanisms beyond the poverty mechanism (see, e.g., 
Moffitt 1983; Duncan et al. 1988; Antel 1992; Durlauf and Shaorshadze 2014). First, a mother’s 
participation might lower her daughter’s stigma associated with welfare as well as other costs of 
participation. A child on welfare can observe and learn how the program ‘works’, while her 
mother does not incorporate potential future costs on her daughter in her utility-maximizing 
behavior. Secondly, contrasting the idea that welfare offers mothers additional resources in times 
of need, participation in government assistance affects job market opportunities for mothers, and 
consequently, can increase dependence for daughters through several factors such as labor force 
attachment and social capital, for example. Essentially, the reform targeted these plausible 
intertemporal mechanisms. Therefore, a framework for identifying the intergenerational 
transmission of dependence needs to move beyond the correlations presented in Figure 2 by 
considering that the reform could affect daughters’ participation decisions. We discuss further 
details on identification in the next section. 
III. Estimating Intergenerational Transmission Pre- and Post-Reform 
Contemporary empirical studies on intergenerational socioeconomic outcomes trace their 
intellectual foundation to the work of Becker and Tomes (1979, 1986), who provide a structural 
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framework of dynastic family decision making. The corresponding canonical statistical model 
involves regressing the outcome of interest of the child on the corresponding outcome of the 
parent, whether it is earnings, education, health, income, wealth, or in our case, welfare 
participation (see surveys in Solon 1999; Black and Devereux 2011). The prima facie evidence 
in Figure 2 suggests a structural break in (AFDC) welfare participation starting during the reform 
era. Introducing welfare reform implies a straightforward modification to the canonical model of 
the intergenerational transmission of welfare before and after reform as 
(1) 𝑊𝑖𝑠𝑡
𝑑 = 𝛼 + 𝛽′𝒙𝑖𝑠𝑡
𝑑 + 𝛿𝑊𝑖𝑠,∀𝑗<𝑡
𝑚 + 𝛾𝑅𝑠𝑡
𝑚 + 𝜃𝑅𝑠𝑡
𝑚𝑊𝑖𝑠,∀𝑗<𝑡
𝑚 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡
𝑑 , 
where 𝑊𝑖𝑠𝑡
𝑑  is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the daughter (d) in family i residing 
in state 𝑠 at time period 𝑡 participates in welfare and 0 otherwise; 𝑊𝑖𝑠,∀𝑗<𝑡
𝑚  takes a value of 1 if 
the mother (m) ever participates in welfare in any prior period 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑡 − 1 and 0 otherwise; 
𝒙𝑖𝑠𝑡
𝑑  is a vector of observed demographic characteristics of the daughter; 𝑅𝑠𝑡
𝑚 is an indicator 
variable that takes a value of 1 when the state of residence of the mother implements welfare 
reform and 0 otherwise; and, 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡
𝑑  is an unobserved error term.2 In this specification, once the 
mother participates, the 𝑊𝑖𝑠,∀𝑗<𝑡
𝑚  variable remains “on” for each subsequent observation. The use 
of ever on welfare for the mother instead of contemporaneous participation serves two purposes: 
first, it implies that once the mother participates in welfare it cannot be “unlearned” by the 
daughter; and second, the ever-on measure captures a longer window and thus attenuates 
potential measurement error. The baseline models define welfare of the daughter and mother as 
participation in AFDC/TANF, but we also estimate models of multiple program participation on 
                                                            
2 While the notation implies that the daughter and mother share the same state 𝑠, this constraint is nonbinding in 
practice where welfare reform implementation and state-level instruments correspond to the mother’s state of 
residence. We test the robustness of the estimates to possible cross-state mobility below. 
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AFDC/TANF, food stamps/SNAP, and SSI.3 In addition, we also explore heterogeneity in the 
transmission mechanisms by age of the daughter when exposed to the mother’s welfare use, as 
well as the length of exposure to the mother’s welfare use.  
In the conditional mean model associated with equation (1), 𝛿 is the intergenerational 
correlation of welfare participation, and 𝛿 + 𝜃 is the correlation after welfare reform. This 
specification is akin to a difference-in-difference model whereby we exploit the quasi-
experimental variation induced by the fact that different states adopted welfare reform at 
different times starting in the early 1990s.4 That is, the indicator 𝑅𝑠𝑡
𝑚 “turns on” when the state s 
implements a waiver and remains on thereafter. By adopting this functional form, we implicitly 
assume that the TANF program implemented after PRWORA is a continuation of the reforms 
begun during the waiver period for those states that were early adopters of reform. This has been 
a standard assumption in the welfare reform literature, though in some cases researchers allow a 
trend break between the waiver era and TANF era (Blank 2002). If welfare reform succeeded in 
reducing the transmission across generations, then we expect that 𝜃 < 0. 
A ubiquitous challenge across the intergenerational transmission literature has been 
establishing a causal pathway from parent to child, i.e. separating out the poverty trap from the 
welfare trap, because the conditional mean assumption for consistency of least squares that 
𝐸[𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡
𝑑 |𝑊𝑖𝑠,∀𝑗<𝑡
𝑚 ,•] = 0 is generally violated. In all the models estimated in this paper, the error 
term of equation (1) is specified as 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡
𝑑 = 𝜇𝑠
𝑑 + 𝜌𝑡
𝑑 + 𝜈𝑖𝑠𝑡
𝑑 , where 𝜇𝑠
𝑑 is a time-invariant state 
fixed effect, and 𝜌𝑡
𝑑is a common year effect. The state effect controls for permanent differences 
                                                            
3 The prior literature generally only provided estimates of AFDC with General Assistance (e.g. Gottschalk 1996), or 
of combined AFDC/GA/Food Stamps/SSI in main results with some discussion of estimates restricted to AFDC/GA 
(e.g. Solon, et al. 1988; Page 2004). 
4 Ziliak, et al. (2000) show that a state’s decision to apply for an AFDC waiver was not an endogenous response to 
caseload size, which supports the use of the waiver reform period as identifying variation for welfare participation.  
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in states such as natural endowments that affect economic opportunities, while the time effect 
controls for macroeconomic and policy changes affecting all daughters the same in a given year. 
While the state and year effects are likely to control for some forms of endogeneity, it is still 
possible that the remaining time-varying error term 𝜈𝑖𝑠𝑡
𝑑  can be correlated with the independent 
variables from endogenous selection, measurement error, life cycle factors, and geographic 
mobility. We discuss each of these threats to identification and how we propose to address them. 
A. Selection Bias 
The conditional mean independence assumption for consistent causal estimates of the 
intergenerational parameters 𝛿 and 𝜃 will break down if there are unobserved characteristics 
common to the mother and daughter that affect the decision to participate. That is, if we backdate 
equation (1) by a generation considering a year, say – 𝑡, and write a model of the mother’s 
participation as a function of her demographics (𝒙𝑖𝑠,−𝑡
𝑚 ) and the welfare choice of her mother (i.e. 
the daughter’s grandmother, 𝑊𝑖𝑠,∀𝑘<−𝑡
𝑔
), then shared tastes for work and welfare within families 
would imply that 𝐸[𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑡
𝑑 𝑣𝑖𝑠,−𝑡
𝑚 |𝒙𝑖𝑠𝑡
𝑑 , 𝑊𝑖𝑠,∀𝑗<𝑡
𝑚 , 𝑅𝑠𝑡
𝑚, 𝒙𝑖𝑠,−𝑡
𝑚 , 𝑊𝑖𝑠,∀𝑘<−𝑡
𝑔
] ≠ 0. The quasi-experimental 
design of using cross-state variation over time in adoption of welfare reform allows us to 
separate the pre- versus post-reform eras, but within the AFDC and TANF eras there still 
remains a possible convolution of state dependence (welfare trap) and unobserved heterogeneity 
(poverty trap).  
There have been several efforts over the years to control for endogenous selection in 
intergenerational welfare participation. In an early study, Solon, et al. (1988) used pairs of sisters 
in order to control for shared family background (i.e. family fixed effects) in identifying the 
effect of parental welfare participation. Antel (1992) adopted Heckman’s (1978) dummy 
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endogenous variable model within the context of a two-limit tobit specification. He included 
exclusion restrictions in the mother’s reduced form equation such as the state’s AFDC benefit 
guarantee and local labor market conditions as proxied by net migration flows. In lieu of 
exclusion restrictions, Gottschalk (1996) addressed unobserved heterogeneity by modeling the 
event histories of daughter’s and mother’s welfare usage in order to identify causal effects 
relative to a mother’s past participation. Levine and Zimmerman (1996) used mother’s 
background as additional control variates, as well as state (e.g. welfare generosity) and local (e.g. 
county unemployment rate) variables as instruments for mother’s welfare participation. Dahl, et 
al. (2014), who examined disability insurance in Norway, used the random assignment of 
appellate-court judges as an instrumental variable to identify parent’s disability participation on 
child’s disability insurance claims. Pepper (2000) eschewed point identification methods of the 
latter authors in favor of nonparametric bounding techniques to control for selection as proposed 
by Manski (1995). Antel, Gottschalk, Pepper, and Dahl, et al. all conclude that parent’s 
participation in welfare is causal for the child and not spurious, while Solon, et al. and Levine 
and Zimmerman provide evidence more in favor of spurious poverty traps.  
Our approach to address possible endogenous selection within welfare regimes is to 
extend the prior point identification literature by exploiting the comparatively long time histories 
now available in the PSID and estimate equation (1) via instrumental variables. Specifically, we 
instrument for mother’s previous welfare participation using the policy parameters defined by the 
state maximum AFDC/TANF benefit guarantee and the combined Federal and state maximum 
EITC. Each of these instruments vary across states, time, and family size—the maximum 
AFDC/TANF guarantee is set by state legislatures, while the maximum Federal EITC is set by 
the U.S. Congress to vary by the number of qualifying children in the family and the state 
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portion is set by state legislatures as a fixed percentage of the Federal credit. Both of the 
variables speak to the prospect of the welfare trap, but in opposite directions. A higher maximum 
AFDC/TANF benefit guarantee means that all else equal welfare is more attractive to the 
mother, while a higher maximum EITC means that work is more attractive than welfare since 
EITC eligibility is work conditioned. To ensure that the policy instruments are most salient to the 
mother’s welfare choice, we restrict the time period of the instruments by aggregating over 
values that are applicable to the mother when her daughter is in the critical exposure ages of 12-
18 years old and not an adult living independently. These welfare policies while the daughter is 
young should have no effect on her subsequent welfare decisions in adulthood except via the 
welfare choice of her mother (Antel 1992; Moffitt 1992; Levine and Zimmerman 1996). We 
describe these instruments in more detail below in the data section, and test both the first-stage 
strength and the validity of overidentifying restrictions in the results section. We also test the 
robustness to different combinations of instruments as well as to additional instruments such as 
the state unemployment rates. 
B. Misclassification Bias 
Misreporting of welfare is present both at the extensive participation margin and the 
intensive dollar-reporting margin, it pervades all social surveys, and has gotten worse over time 
(Meyer, et al. 2015a,b). In the case of welfare participation, misreports can be in the form of 
“false negatives”—the respondent states they do not receive assistance when in fact they do—
and “false positives”—the respondent states they receive assistance when in fact they do not. 
Based on validation studies of the Food Stamp Program and TANF, most misclassifications are 
false negatives (Bollinger and David 1997, 2001; Meyer, Goerge, and Mittag 2014; Meyer and  
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Mittag 2014, 2015).5 The reasons for the increase in misreporting are generally unknown, but 
this trend may in part be a result of the increasing importance of in-kind transfers in the TANF 
program, which are generally more difficult for the respondent to place a monetary value.  
Remedies for classification bias are not straightforward in the context of dichotomous 
variables. A standard approach for continuous variables in the intergenerational income literature 
with classical measurement error is to take 3- or 5-year averages of parent’s (and possibly 
child’s) income (Solon 1992, 1999; Mazumder 2005). While such averages are likely to improve 
things in dichotomous participation models, this is not ensured as the errors have been found to 
vary systematically with characteristics and are nonclassical. Some have proposed parametric or 
semiparametric adjustments to the likelihood function to incorporate misclassification (Bollinger 
and David 1997, 2001, 2005; Hausman et al. 1998; Meyer and Mittag 2014), while others have 
proposed partial-identification nonparametric bounding techniques (Bollinger 1996; Black, 
Berger, and Scott 2000; Molinari 2008; Kreider, et al. 2012; Kreider, Pepper, and Roy 2016). 
These solutions have been proposed for cross-sectional data either for measurement error in the 
dichotomous dependent variable, or the independent variable, though we have potentially 
mismeasured dichotomous variables on both the left- and right-hand sides of the equation.  
We consider several potential remedies for misclassification bias. First, evidence in 
Bollinger and David (2005) showed that respondents have a latent propensity to report or not 
report, and that cooperation increases with length of panel participation. As we describe in the 
Data section, since we follow mothers for at least 14 years on average and daughters for 25 
years, correct reporting should be more prevalent than in a sample with short observation 
                                                            
5 When false positives do occur, the issue is often misreporting the correct source of actual transfer income or 
mistaking the timing of receipt, thus aggregate measures of welfare participation over time or across survey 
questions should diminish the relevance of this error type. 
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windows. Second, for right-hand-side mismeasurement of mother’s participation, again recall 
that we measure if the mother ever participates, which is likely to be less noisy than 
contemporaneous participation.6 Moreover, the instrumental variables discussed in the prior 
section on selection bias are also likely to improve matters for misreports of mother’s 
participation. Third, for left-hand-side classification error, we consider parametric bias-
corrections along the lines proposed in Bollinger and David (1997, 2001) and Hausman, et al. 
(1998). Specifically, we follow Hausman et al. (1998) and assume that misreporting is 
independent of model covariates and constant across individuals, which implies that the partial 
effect of mother’s participation on daughter’s participation in equation (1) from observed data is 
proportional to the true partial effects, 
(2) 
P(𝑊𝑖𝑠𝑡
𝑑 = 1|𝑊𝑖𝑠,∀𝑗<𝑡
𝑚 = 1, •) − P(𝑊𝑖𝑠𝑡
𝑑 = 1|𝑊𝑖𝑠,∀𝑗<𝑡
𝑚 = 0, •) =                              
(1 − 𝜏0𝑡 − 𝜏1𝑡)(𝛿 + 𝜃𝑅𝑠𝑡
𝑚),
 
where • represents other controls, 𝜏0𝑡 is the false positive reporting rate at time 𝑡, and 𝜏1𝑡 is the 
false negative reporting rate at time 𝑡. To implement this correction, we set the false positive rate 
to 0, and for the linear probability models rescale all the right-hand-side variables in equation (1) 
by (1 − ?̂?1𝑡), which is based on estimates of AFDC/TANF reporting rates in the PSID by Meyer, 
Mok, and Sullivan (2015b) as depicted in Appendix Table A1. Appendix A offers additional 
details on the two-stage approach to estimate the parameter of interest in equation (2). 
C. Life-Cycle Bias 
A data constraint facing most intergenerational research is that full life cycles of 
                                                            
6 For further support that the mother’s indicator for any prior welfare participation is measured more accurately, 
Appendix A demonstrates how the probability of ever misreporting tends to zero as the number of mother 
observations increases. 
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daughters and mothers are generally not available. This leads to two related forms of bias, 
potentially reinforcing. One form of bias results from the fact that mothers and daughters are 
typically observed at different points of their life cycles. In the intergenerational income mobility 
literature, this has come to be known as life-cycle bias (Jenkins 1987; Haider and Solon 2006; 
Grawe 2006; Lee and Solon 2009; Nybom and Stuhler 2016). The issue with income is that 
daughters tend to be observed when young and incomes low (but rising), and mothers at middle 
age when incomes are high (and stable or perhaps falling). This systematic deviation of current 
income from lifetime income is a form of nonclassical measurement error and tends to attenuate 
the intergenerational correlation of incomes. In the welfare context, participation tends to be high 
when young, both because incomes are low and odds of the presence of young children high, and 
participation is low when older (for the opposite reason of the young), again leading to 
attenuation in the intergenerational correlation. 
A related measurement issue, frequently referred to as the “windows problem” in the 
welfare literature (Gottschalk 1992, 1996; Wolfe, et al. 1996; Page 2004), occurs when the 
length of observation is too short for either, or perhaps both, generations. The windows problem 
is a form of measurement error in the sense that limited observations of an individual’s welfare 
participation is an underreporting issue when complete histories are not available. Short windows 
could lead to underestimation of parameters if true participation is omitted, yet it could also lead 
to overestimation if long-term spells are overrepresented in the short window and long-term 
exposure matters more for transmitting dependency.  
In the income mobility literature, Lee and Solon (2009) propose ameliorating the life-
cycle bias by including controls for parent’s age, normalized child’s age, and interactions 
between child’s normalized age and parent’s income. The normalized child’s age is measured as 
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the deviation around age 40, which is the point in the life cycle when annual income serves as a 
reasonable proxy for lifetime income.7 The window problem is then addressed by taking three- 
or five-year averages of parent’s income (Solon 1992; Zimmerman 1992; Mazumder 2005). Page 
(2004) experimented with various window lengths and found that previous estimates of welfare 
transmission were downward biased because the daughters were observed for shorter windows 
earlier in their life cycle, and in particular, that length of daughter’s window mattered more than 
length of mother’s window (but both mattered). 
Our primary solution to the life-cycle bias and window problem is to utilize the much 
longer time series now available in the PSID compared to prior studies, though we also introduce 
life-cycle adjustments as in Lee and Solon (2009). For each mother-daughter pair, we observe 
the daughter as head/spouse of her own family unit for 25 years on average and for as long as 38 
years. In addition, we observe the mother and daughter co-residing for 14 years on average with 
at least 5 years during the daughter’s ages 12-18 when the potential for welfare learning is 
heightened. Thus, we come much closer to approximating the life cycle of welfare participation, 
especially given the requirement of dependent children under age 18 and the fact that fertility of 
low-income mothers tends to peak in their early to mid 20s (Lopoo 2007). However, we also 
present estimates that incorporate the Lee and Solon (2009) age adjustment, along with 
alternative observation windows that differentiate critical periods of welfare exposure. Because 
fertility rates among low-income women peak in their mid 20s, we detrend around daughter’s 
age of 25. 
                                                            
7 Nybom and Stuhler (2016) continue to find window bias for intergenerational income estimates, even after making 
the Lee and Solon adjustment. Gottschalk (1996) addresses the life-cycle problem by including a long event history 
of mother’s AFDC participation, but using a 6-year observation window for daughters. 
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D. Cross-State Mobility 
The power and exogeneity of the instrument variables hinge on the degree to which 
welfare policies determine participation, and on the extent to which families have no control over 
welfare policy, especially via endogenous migration. Numerous studies demonstrated that even 
though the economy accounted for more of the decline in welfare in the mid 1990s, welfare 
waivers also reduced participation, especially in those states adopting more stringent 
responsibility and time limit policies (Council of Economic Advisers 1997; Ziliak et al. 2000; 
Blank 2001; Grogger 2003). Moreover, others found that declining participation stemmed more 
from declining entry onto welfare, and not exit (Grogger, et al. 2003; Grogger and Karoly 2005; 
Haider and Klerman 2005; Frogner, et al. 2009; Ziliak 2016). This suggests that initial exposures 
to welfare fell in response to the policy reforms. On the other hand, the evidence on whether 
there is endogenous internal migration in response to welfare generosity in the U.S. is mixed 
(Levine and Zimmerman 1999; Gelbach 2004; McKinnish 2007; Kennan and Walker 2010), yet 
when effects are found, they are very small in magnitude. Also, Ziliak, et al. (2000) show that 
states’ decisions to adopt waivers were not an endogenous response to the growing welfare 
caseload in the early 1990s. Both of these suggest that state-level welfare policies like the 
maximum guarantee are exogenous to an individual’s welfare choice. We examine the 
robustness of the estimated intergenerational transmission parameter considering several sample 
restrictions to non-movers, such as daughters residing in their birth state during adulthood and 
daughters who never move states during adulthood. 
IV. Data 
The data come from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), which was begun in 
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1968 as a survey of 4,800 American families. The survey has followed the children and 
grandchildren of original sample parents as they split off to form their own households so that 
today there are over 10,000 PSID families and 24,000 individuals. As the longest continuously 
running longitudinal survey, the PSID is ideally suited for the study of intergenerational 
transmission, and has been found to be robust over time to changes in sample composition 
(Fitzgerald, Gottschalk, and Moffitt 1998; Fitzgerald 2011). The original sample drew about 60 
percent of the families from the nationally representative Survey Research Center (SRC) 
subsample, and the other 40 percent from an oversample of low-income and minority families as 
part of the Survey of Economic Opportunity (SEO) subsample. We focus on linked mother-
daughter pairs over the entire life of the PSID survey years from 1968-2013, and in order to 
ensure adequate sample sizes we include observations from both the SRC and SEO subsamples.  
The oversample of low-income families in the PSID allows for more precise estimation 
of welfare participation, yet this unrepresentative sample will yield biased causal estimates if, 
after conditioning on control variables, the selection probability remains endogenous to 
daughter’s welfare participation, or if there exist heterogeneous transmission effects relative to 
the oversampled population (see Solon, Haider, and Wooldridge 2015).8 Some examples in the 
literature have addressed endogenous sampling directly by controlling on observed 
characteristics (Corcoran, et al. 1992; Pepper 2000), or by restricting the estimation sample to the 
SRC only (Moffitt and Gottschalk 2002; Lee and Solon 2009). Other examples have used 
weights for estimators that are based on frequency counts (Solon, et al. 1988; Page 2004), as a 
sensitivity check (Solon 1992), or in the main estimation (Hoynes and Schanzenbach 2012). A 
primary concern for our estimates is the potential heterogeneity of welfare participation 
                                                            
8 See PSID documentation for background on survey selection procedures and sample weight construction. For 
detailed issues relate to the Survey of Economic Opportunity, see Brown (1996). 
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transmission by race coupled with overrepresented low-income, minority families, and our 
model maintains a fairly parsimonious structure that may not adequately account for this source 
of bias. Therefore, in all of our estimation results, we provide weighted estimates with the 
unweighted versions in brackets below.  
In an effort to address the issues of selection bias, life cycle bias, and the windows 
problem, our baseline sample consists of mother-daughter pairs that are observed for at least five 
years while the daughter is living in the same household during the critical exposure period 
spanning the ages of 12-18, and that the daughter is observed at least five years as the head of her 
own family unit. Selecting adolescence and teenage years as the observation window for 
childhood exposure pervades the welfare transmission literature (Solon, et al. 1988; Duncan and 
Yeung 1995; Gottschalk 1996; Pepper 2000; Page 2004). Part of this stems from data needs; that 
is, if we require observing early childhood as well as enough years in adulthood, then we will 
impose greater demands on the data in terms of length of time in the panel and in turn end up 
with fewer mother-daughter observations. The other reason for focusing on adolescent and 
teenage years is that cognitive, emotional, and physiological development are sufficiently 
advanced for the potential of “welfare learning” from the parent. However, it remains an open 
question in the literature which stage of childhood development is most important for the 
potential of welfare learning. Research shows that economic deprivation in early childhood has 
more deleterious effects in terms of achievement and health in early adulthood than does similar 
deprivation during adolescence (Duncan, et al. 1998; Duncan and Brooks-Gunn 2000; Ziol-
Guest, et al. 2012; Elango, et al. 2016). But this research has not separated out the independent 
role of welfare in this process. As such, we follow convention and focus on the five years 
observed during the ages 12-18 as a key period of welfare exposure for our baseline models, and 
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then explore how the estimates change as the age of exposure changes.  
A daughter is considered an adult at first childbirth or when establishing a new family 
unit if she is at least age 14, though she may continue to live at home as a subfamily. This yields 
a baseline sample of 2,961 mother-daughter pairs spanning 56,067 observation years of the 
daughter as an adult. On average, we observe mothers and daughters co-residing for 14 years in 
total and for 6.3 years during the critical ages of 12-18, and we observe daughters as adults for 
25 years. In the results section, we report estimates from specifications that both loosen and 
tighten the observation windows for both mothers and daughters, and also examine the length of 
exposure.  
[Table 1 here] 
Table 1 contains the key variables from the baseline sample used in estimation of 
equation (1), separated into the pre- and post-welfare reform eras, and weighted by the 
daughter’s core longitudinal weight. The dependent variable takes on a value of 0 or 1 based on 
whether the daughter participates in welfare at any time after she has formed her own family 
unit. We consider two definitions of welfare, one that captures participation in AFDC/TANF or 
“other welfare” such as General Assistance (which we simply refer to as AFDC/TANF for 
succinctness), and a second which captures participation in any of AFDC/TANF, food 
stamps/SNAP, or SSI.9 This variable varies over time because of possible movements on and off 
welfare across her life course. While 4.4 percent of daughters receive AFDC/TANF as adults in 
an average year over the sample period, as seen in Table 1, the odds of participation are nearly 
                                                            
9 The PSID asks about AFDC/TANF receipt of the family head, spouse, and other family members, as well as an 
“other welfare” category (not including SSI, food stamps, workers’ compensation, housing, Social Security). This 
other welfare category can contain assistance from various public sources including General Assistance. 
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70 percent lower after welfare reform, falling from 8 percent to 2.5 percent.10 On the other hand, 
there is much more stability over time in participation in any of the three programs, with 13.2 
percent receiving AFDC/TANF, food stamps/SNAP, or SSI before reform and 11.2 percent 
afterwards. Almost all of the additional uptake in welfare use is from food stamps/SNAP. 
The key independent variable is mother’s welfare participation found in the bottom panel 
of Table 1, which takes a value of 1 if the mother ever participates in welfare at any time prior to 
a given age-year of her daughter, and 0 otherwise. Table 1 shows that about 27 percent of 
mothers were ever on AFDC/TANF prior to welfare reform, and 6.7 percent were ever on during 
the period after reform, while those figures jump to 43 and 19 percent, respectively, if the mother 
ever received AFDC/TANF, food stamps/SNAP, or SSI. Note that it is possible for the mother to 
first participate on welfare after the daughter forms her own family unit. For AFDC/TANF 
participation, this can occur only if the mother has children (or dependents) under age 18 
remaining in the household other than the focal daughter. Learning thus can occur from direct 
exposure while the daughter resides in the household with her mother, or from indirect “word of 
mouth” once the daughter forms her own family unit. We discuss this mechanism in the results 
section below. 
The other focal regressor in equation (1) is the indicator for welfare reform. As discussed 
previously, states began reforming AFDC in earnest starting in 1992, four years prior to passage 
of PRWORA. States had to submit requests for waivers from Federal rules to the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services, e.g., to introduce a time limit on benefits or to 
expand asset limits for eligibility. If the waiver was approved, then there was generally a lag 
                                                            
10 If the percent of daughters participating in AFDC/TANF are adjusted for misclassification (by inflating sample 
statistics by the reporting rates shown in Appendix Table A1), then the baseline participation over the sample period 
would be 7.8 percent of daughters, which then falls to an adjusted 5.6 percent after welfare reform. 
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between the time of approval and when the policy was implemented. Indeed, some approved 
waivers never were implemented (Grogger and Karoly 2005). We thus use the implementation 
date of the waiver as the date when reform is first in place, and the variable remains on for each 
year thereafter. For those states that did not implement waivers we use the implementation date 
of their TANF program. While the major AFDC waiver implementation period is defined as 
1992-1996, the earliest major waivers were officially implemented in Michigan and New Jersey 
as of October 1992, and the latest implementation of TANF was in New York as of November 
1997. In our data, the implementation of welfare reform is denoted by the earliest year in which 
at least 3 quarters of the year are observed after reform (either by waiver or TANF), implying 
that the reform variable spans 1993-1998.11 We achieve identification because of cross-state 
variation over time in the welfare reform indicator. As seen in Table 1, 65 percent of daughter-
year observations occur after welfare reform is implemented, while for mothers it is just about 14 
percent.  
Table 1 also contains demographic characteristics of the daughter and mother, including 
age, race, number of children, and geographic mobility. Daughters are 28 years old on average 
before reform and 39 after reform, while mothers are 43 and 59 years old, respectively, 
highlighting the long observation windows we observe families compared to prior research. For 
the estimation sample, approximately 72 percent of daughters reside in their state of birth during 
adulthood.12 We use four measures of welfare generosity for our instruments: the average and 
maximum state-specific AFDC/TANF benefit standard for families of 2, 3, or 4 or more persons, 
and the average and maximum combined Federal and state EITC benefit for 0, 1, or 2 or more 
                                                            
11 For specific dates of welfare reform waiver approval and implementation, see Crouse (1999). 
12 Also, statistics not shown in Table 1 indicate that 63 percent of daughters live in the same state as their mothers, 
while 57 percent never change states during the entire observation period. 
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dependents. The EITC benefit is defined as 𝐸𝐼𝑇𝐶𝑖𝑡 ∗ (1 + 𝑝𝑖𝑠𝑡), where 𝐸𝐼𝑇𝐶𝑖𝑡 is the Federal 
credit that varies by the number of qualifying children and year and 𝑝𝑖𝑠𝑡 is the fraction of the 
Federal EITC that a state refunds on the state return. The Federal EITC was begun in 1975, and 
expanded in 1986, 1991, 1993, and 2009, while states began introducing the refundable state 
EITC in the late 1980s. By the mid 2000s, nearly half the states had a separate EITC, providing 
cross-state and family-size variation over time in the instrument. The nominal values of the 
maximum guarantees and credit are converted to real 2012 dollars using the personal 
consumption expenditure deflator.13 
V. Results 
 In presenting the empirical results, we first focus on the baseline linear probability model 
correcting for nonrandom selection, misclassification error, life-cycle bias, and cross-state 
mobility in order to provide a baseline estimate of welfare transmission and the effects of welfare 
reform. We then explore timing of transmission by age and duration of exposure, heterogeneity 
by race and welfare reform aggressiveness, and transmission through multiple program 
participation. All models control for time-varying demographic controls of the daughter (a 
quadratic in her age and indicators for the number of children in her home) as well as dummy 
variables for state of residence and year. The standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and 
clustered at the state level given the focus on state welfare reforms.  
                                                            
13 Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2016, Personal Consumption Expenditures Excluding Food and 
Energy, Chain-Type Price Index [series: DPCCRG3A086NBEA], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of 
St. Louis. 
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A. Baseline Estimates 
 Table 2 contains the baseline estimates of the parameters of interest in equation (1), with 
and without instrumental variables and corrections for misclassification of the dependent 
variable. The least squares estimate of the effect of mother’s AFDC participation prior to welfare 
reform in column (1) is 0.145 for weighted estimates and 0.203 for unweighted, which is within 
the range of estimates among studies from that era surveyed in Page (2004).14 That correlation 
falls 69 percent after welfare reform to 0.044 (=0.145-0.101). We note that the after welfare 
reform variable has a positive effect on daughter’s participation when controlling for daughter’s 
age and year fixed effects, suggesting that in the absence of welfare reform the trend increase in 
intergenerational transmission would have continued. Column (2) presents instrumental variables 
estimates whereby both the direct effect of mother’s participation and the interaction with 
welfare reform are instrumented (the interaction is identified by interacting the welfare reform 
indicator with the four instruments of average and maximum of mother’s AFDC/TANF benefit 
standard and federal/state EITC by family size during the critical exposure period of daughter’s 
ages 12 to 18).15 In the IV specification, the pre- and post-reform effect sizes of mother’s 
participation are nearly two-thirds larger compared to estimates in column (1), thus the 
transmission mechanism is still attenuated by 69 percent to 0.074 (=0.238-0.164).16 The null 
hypothesis of weak instruments is rejected using the Kleibergen-Paap rank test, while the null of 
                                                            
14 Note that this estimate is lower than a simple average of the trend estimates in Figure 2 because the samples differ. 
Figure 2 depicts whether the daughter is ever on welfare before age 27, while the sample used in estimating equation 
(1) is for any contemporaneous welfare use after forming a family unit, regardless of daughter age. Table 2 also 
includes state and year effects as well as daughter control variables, while the figure shows unconditional 
correlations. 
15 Given that the model is overidentified, and the error term is possibly heteroscedastic and correlated across 
families within states, we therefore estimate the models using generalized instrumental variables (GIV), which can 
be interpreted as a form of generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator. 
16 The estimated welfare transmission effect after welfare reform in column (2) has a standard error of 0.025 and is 
statistically different from zero with a p-value of approximately 0.003. 
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valid overidentifying restrictions is not, suggesting our IV estimates are consistent. Further, these 
estimates are robust to the addition of state unemployment rates to the instrument set, shown in 
Appendix Table B1, and the addition of family background controls such as mother’s income 
and education during the daughter’s critical exposure ages, shown in Appendix Table B2.17 
[Table 2 here] 
The results indicate a clear pattern of welfare reform reducing the transmission of 
participation. However, the percent changes above represent changes in levels, and it has been 
noted from Table 1 that the levels in welfare participation rates are quite different before and 
after reform. If we consider percent changes in transmission as a fraction of the baseline 
probability, then the effect of welfare reform in column (2) would be a 45 percent reduction (=1-
((0.238-0.164)/0.025)/(0.238/0.044)) using baseline participation rates for the overall period and 
after reform taken from Table 1. As discussed by Fang and Keane (2004), it is not clear that this 
statistic is necessarily more informative than the change in levels, but simply provides an 
alternative interpretation of the point estimates.  
Note that point estimates for the unweighted results shown in brackets are larger in 
magnitude than the weighted estimates. Without sample weights, heterogeneity introduced by the 
oversampling of low-income families in the SEO upwardly biases the magnitude of mother’s 
participation effect relative to a population average effect, yet the qualitative interpretations are 
the same including similar percent changes after reform. The standard errors for unweighted 
                                                            
17 Earlier drafts included state labor market conditions in the baseline instrument set. Although prior research has 
demonstrated the strong role the macroeconomy plays in determining participation in AFDC/TANF, it also is a key 
determinant of the cyclicality of poverty rates and thus may not be as effective in separating out the poverty trap 
from the welfare trap. We thank Anna Aizer and Lara Shore-Sheppard for making this point. Regarding controls for 
mother’s income and education, Levine and Zimmerman (1996) note that these variables could be endogenous to the 
daughter’s welfare choice for the same reasons that the mother’s welfare participation is likely to be endogenous. 
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estimates (not shown but available upon request) are also larger, though by much smaller 
proportions such that the statistical significance of results is essentially independent of weighting 
choice. As a further robustness check, Appendix Table B3 re-estimates the results from Table 2 
for the SRC sample showing smaller magnitudes but, again, a similar qualitative story for the 
effects of welfare reform. 
While our baseline estimates intrinsically address misclassification of the mother’s 
welfare participation by design (longer panels of non-attriters, instrumental variables, and ever 
on welfare instead of contemporaneous), we do not directly address the possibility of a binary 
mismeasured dependent variable. Columns (3) and (4) in Table 2 show the baseline estimates 
with misclassification bias corrections. As expected, the estimates are larger than those with no 
correction in columns (1) and (2), and indeed the corrected estimates without instruments in 
column (3) are on par with the uncorrected IV estimates in column (2). We note that the bias-
corrected estimates are likely to be upper-bounds because the estimates of reporting rates from  
Meyer, et al. (2015b) come from annual cross sections of the PSID but our sample consists of a 
long panel of stayers who tend to be more accurate in reporting (Bollinger and David 2005). 
[Table 3 here] 
 Next, we explore how the IV estimates (without and with misclassification corrections) 
vary once we adjust the length of observation window for mother and daughter living together 
during potential years of welfare exposure, which may be critical years susceptible to life-cycle 
bias. We argued that our estimates are less vulnerable to this form of bias because we observe the 
typical daughter for two and a half decades after forming her own family unit, and that we 
impose the requirement that mothers and daughters co-reside at least five years while the 
daughter is aged 12 to 18. In Table 3, we examine the windows problem by first eliminating 
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minimum restrictions on mother-daughter observations, and then extending the minimum 
requirement that the pairs be observed for at least ten and fifteen years, respectively. There we 
see that the reduction in the level of mother’s transmission after welfare reform ranges between 
54 percent to 77 percent, while the reduction in terms of baseline probability of participation 
ranges between 36 percent and 60 percent, both of which are comparable to the estimates 
reported in Table 2.  
[Table 4 here] 
 Next, in Table 4 we address potential life-cycle bias by following the method suggested 
in Lee and Solon (2009). Specifically, we augment the model with a quartic in the average age of 
the mother during prior (to time t) periods of potential welfare participation, a quartic in the 
detrended daughter’s current age, and the interactions between the quartic in daughter’s 
detrended age and mother’s participation as well as the indicator for mother’s participation after 
welfare reform. Note that as before the interactions with mother’s welfare participation are 
endogenous in our setting, and therefore, in the IV models of columns (2) and (4) we instrument 
using the detrended quartic in daughter’s age times the average of mother’s AFDC/TANF benefit 
standard and federal/state EITC by family size when the daughter was living with the mother and 
she was between 12 and 18 years old, and we also use these instruments interacted with reform. 
Comparing the OLS estimates in column (1) of Tables 2 and 4, it is clear that the age 
adjustments do not influence the results qualitatively (with only small quantitative differences), 
which implies that the longer observation panels account for life-cycle differences adequately 
well. Further comparisons across columns (2)-(4) remain generally consistent with our baseline 
story. While the percent reductions after reform are smaller, the need for age adjustment in the 
context of instrumental variables and misclassification correction is not well understood, which 
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may merit further research. 
[Table 5 here] 
Our models to this point have allowed for the possibility that daughters reside in a 
different state than their mothers and/or have moved to another state during adulthood. If such 
movements are an endogenous response to the welfare climate in the state, then this could lead to 
biased estimates of welfare reform and the transmission across generations. As a test on our 
baseline sample, we consider three alternatives to our IV models in Table 2: restricting the 
sample of daughters to those who reside in the same state as their birth state, restricting the 
sample of daughters residing in the same state as their mothers, and restricting the sample of 
daughters to those who never move during their observed lifetime. Table 5 shows that both the 
direct effect of mothers’ participation and the interaction with welfare reform are larger in 
absolute value in Table 5 compared to estimates in Table 2, yet the changes are relatively 
proportional such that both the percent reduction in levels and percent-over-baseline reduction of 
transmission after welfare reform are roughly the same. The magnitudes of estimates in Table 5 
are suggestive that the mobility of daughters across state lines can “undo” some of the 
intergenerational transmission of welfare, although the differences from the baseline estimates 
are modest.  
B. Timing of Welfare Transmission Effects 
We next explore potential timing of welfare transmission and reform effects based on the 
age and duration of daughter’s exposure to mothers’ welfare participation. In the first set of 
results, we examine how the base-case IV estimates without and with misclassification 
corrections in Table 2 change if we restrict the daughter’s potential welfare exposure to only 
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periods of co-residence. Recall that in Table 2, the daughter could be exposed to her mother’s 
welfare use at any time in the life cycle provided it was prior to the current period t, including 
those periods when the daughter no longer lived at home but had younger siblings at home that 
make her mother welfare-eligible. In the first two columns of Table 6, we see that the pre-reform 
transmission effect is modestly larger relative to the baseline in Table 2, but again, the post-
reform interaction changes proportionally. This implies that welfare reform had the same percent 
reduction of welfare transmission among those daughters exposed only during co-residence.  
[Table 6 here] 
In our baseline models, we require mothers and daughters to co-reside at least five years 
during the ages of 12-18. As discussed in the data section, this age range was selected in part 
from convention in the literature, but there is little prior evidence on whether “age of exposure” 
mattered for welfare learning. In Figure 3, we present new empirical evidence of age at critical 
exposure windows by using rolling five-year and ten-year windows from age 4 through age 17. 
The panels are organized with weighted estimates in the top row of panels and unweighted in the 
bottom row, while the left column of panels shows 5-year windows and the right column 10-year 
windows. The figure presents IV estimates of the pre-welfare reform effect of mothers’ AFDC 
participation and the interaction between mother’s participation and reform, along with 95-
percent pointwise confidence intervals. Figure 3 shows that the magnitude of the direct effect of 
the mother’s participation increases as the age of first exposure increases, suggesting that the 
learning effect is stronger during adolescence and teen years relative to early childhood. The 
definition of a critical exposure period matters more for shorter windows given that larger 
windows are more likely to include some critical learning period. Also, a comparison between 
weighted and unweighted estimates magnifies the importance of observing the critical age 
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window, e.g., the absence of survey weights in panel C implies a higher representation of low-
income families where the magnitude differences across ages are more pronounced. 
[Figure 3 here] 
As a further exploration of age of exposure, columns (3)-(5) in Table 6 present panel-data 
fixed-effects estimates of the welfare transmission without and with instruments and 
misclassification corrections. Specifically, we admit error components into the model consisting 
of latent person-specific heterogeneity as 𝜈𝑖𝑠𝑡
𝑑 = 𝜆𝑖
𝑑 + 𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑡
𝑑 , where 𝜆𝑖
𝑑 is a time-invariant daughter 
fixed effect and 𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑡
𝑑  is an error term. We assume that the daughter fixed effect contains a 
component common to the daughter and the mother from shared family heritage and experiences 
(including health status, attitudes), as well as that which is daughter-specific such as school 
quality and neighborhood. Identification of the direct, pre-reform effect of mother’s participation 
is subtler in the fixed-effects specification. Namely, transmission can only occur via “word-of-
mouth” from mother to daughter after the daughter has left home to form her own family unit. 
This follows from our definition of mother’s prior welfare use that once the variable “turns on” it 
remains on for the duration that they remain in the sample. If the mother joins welfare while the 
daughter co-resides then we cannot separate this from the fixed effect; however, if she joins after 
the daughter leaves because of younger children present, then verbal transmission of the program 
can still occur and identify the parameters of interest.18  
The direct effect of mother’s transmission in column (3) of Table 6 is almost half the size 
of the estimate from column (1) of Table 2, suggesting that a sizable fraction of the transmission 
                                                            
18 Appendix Table B4 restricts the sample to eldest daughters only, showing that the results of Table 2 are not 
sensitive to which daughter is exposed to welfare. However, the misclassification-corrected IV estimate of the effect 
of mother’s participation after reform is statistically insignificant at conventional levels. 
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that is passed from parent to child occurs after the daughter leaves home. In fact, the total effect 
after welfare reform is negative (0.079 – 0.128), suggesting that welfare reform shut down this 
transmission channel. However, fixed-effects methods exacerbate attenuation bias, so it is natural 
to find estimates lower in absolute value.19 Once we make time-varying corrections for 
misclassification in column (4), the mother’s direct effect only drops about one tenth from the 
estimate in column (3) of Table 2, though the percent change after reform is larger and we cannot 
reject that the mother’s post-reform transmission via word of mouth is equal to zero given a p-
value of 0.293. For completeness, given that selection is likely to be time-varying, we also 
present IV fixed-effects estimates with misclassification corrections in column (5), but the model 
is not well identified as indicated by the ten-fold increase in standard errors for the mother’s 
direct participation effect.  
[Table 7 here] 
A daughter’s exposure to welfare and her resulting propensity for dependence will likely 
vary as a function of her mother’s duration of participation, or otherwise stated, her intensity of 
treatment exposure. Gottschalk and Moffitt (1994) propose measuring welfare dependence as the 
total time on welfare or the total percent of income from transfers, and Pepper (2000) models 
daughters’ welfare outcomes depending on categorical definitions of mother’s duration in years. 
In order to allow the mother’s effect to vary by duration, we separate mother’s participation into 
two groups: duration for at most 2 years and duration for more than 2 years (the omitted category 
is zero welfare participation).  
Table 7 shows the effects of mother’s welfare participation differentiated by short- and 
                                                            
19 For measurement error in a dichotomous independent variable in a panel setting, see Freeman (1984); the case for 
errors in continuous variables in panels is addressed by Griliches and Hausman (1986). 
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long-term welfare dependence on the same dependent variable described above, that is, a 
daughter’s extensive-margin decision to participate in a given year. As one might expect, the 
effect of long-term mother’s participation on welfare is larger than the effect of short-term 
participation in all variants of the model.20 Regardless of whether we instrument or adjust for 
misclassification, the estimates suggest that welfare reform had a larger effect of reducing the 
level and percent of longer-term spells compared to shorter-term spells. 
C. Heterogeneity of Welfare Transmission Effects 
 There is a vast literature on the socioeconomic differences between blacks and whites 
(see, for example, Smith and Welch 1989; Duncan and Hoffman 1990; Donohue and Heckman 
1991), but with the notable exceptions of Gottschalk (1996) and Pepper (2000), whether or not 
there are racial differences in the transmission of intergenerational welfare has received less 
attention compared to other outcomes. The issue is salient in part because the risk of out-of-
wedlock births is at least two times higher among blacks than whites, as is the risk of poverty in 
childhood.  
[Table 8 here] 
 The first three columns of Table 8 present estimates for the transmission of AFDC/TANF 
from mother to daughter separated by blacks and whites. Specifically, we include an indicator 
variable for whether the daughter is black, and we interact that with both mother’s participation 
and welfare reform (and interact all instrumental variables with the indicator for daughter’s race). 
                                                            
20 We tested for the difference between the effect of mother’s participation for greater than 2 years and participation 
for at most 2 years and found that we reject at 10-percent significance the equality of these coefficients in columns 
(1) and (3), yet the IV estimates in columns (2) and (4) do not estimate the mother’s direct effect precisely enough 
even though the economic differences are substantial. In the unweighted estimates (where low-income families are 
overrepresented), we reject equality for columns (1)-(3) whereas the p-value corresponding to column (4) is 0.133.  
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As before, all models control for state and year effects, a quadratic in daughter’s age, and 
indicators for the number of children in the daughter’s family. The first two columns in the upper 
panel of Table 8 without and with controls for (fixed) unobserved heterogeneity, as well as the 
IV estimates in column (3), suggest that the direct effect of welfare transmission was much 
stronger among blacks than whites. Comparing OLS and fixed-effect estimates in columns (1) 
and (2), the proportion of transmission that might be attributed to word of mouth after the 
daughter leaves home is similar for black and white families.21 However, comparing OLS to IV 
estimates in column (3), the direct transmission effect for IV is about 2.5 times larger than OLS 
for black mothers while similar in magnitude for white mothers, which implies that selection has 
a prominent role in black-white differences. This is similar to the finding in Gottschalk (1996).22 
In all three specifications, welfare reform eliminates the transmission mechanism among whites, 
and reduces it by at least 44 percent in levels among blacks. It is important to note that racial 
disparities in intergenerational mobility may be related to institutional factors that merit further 
research (see, e.g., Chetty et al. 2014; Corcoran and Adams 1997). 
States differed dramatically in the degree of aggressiveness in implementation of welfare 
reform, both in the waiver era and after TANF. While there is no agreed upon measure of 
strictness in the literature, we follow Grogger and Karoly (2005, Table 4.2) and define strict 
states as those whereby all main studies surveyed agree that the sanctions policy adopted by the 
state during 1992-1996 was strict (there were 13 states that met this criteria). Ziliak (2007) 
examines five different categories of welfare reform aggressiveness and concludes that the latter 
                                                            
21 This evidence should be interpreted with caution. Measurement issues on the right- and left-hand-side variables 
can be exacerbated in panel models with fixed effects (for errors in repeat measures of independent variables, see 
Freeman 1984; Griliches and Hausman 1986). 
22 Gottschalk’s (1996) evidence in favor of causation is strongest for white families, while for black families a 
considerable fraction of the intergenerational link is spurious. 
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measure was the best proxy for strict policy reforms. We then include this measure of welfare 
reform stringency in a triple-difference framework to test whether there were differences in 
intergenerational transmission in those states that adopted more-strict reforms compared to states 
with less-strict reforms. 
The last three columns of Table 8 report estimates corresponding to the effects of interest 
for the triple-difference model based on state reform aggressiveness. Across all three 
specifications, the transmission mechanisms between mother and daughter before welfare reform 
were qualitatively smaller in aggressive states than in non-aggressive states based on weakly 
negative coefficients for the interaction between mother’s participation and strictness (in results 
not shown but available upon request).23 This suggests that there was some permanent difference 
among residents in states adopting strict reforms versus less strict reforms. However, after 
reform, this difference was attenuated, resulting in very similar percent reductions in both the 
levels and probability of participation, suggesting some degree of convergence in welfare 
climates across states after welfare reform. 
D. The Wider Safety Net 
 Even if welfare reform reduced the causal transmission of AFDC/TANF participation, a 
relevant policy question is the extent to which welfare defined more generally is transmitted 
across generations. In our last set of results, we examine what effect welfare reform had on the 
decision to participate more broadly in the social safety net. In Table 9, we present estimates that 
are parallel to Table 2; namely, all models include observable daughter characteristics, state, and 
                                                            
23 However, the effect of mother’s participation interacted with aggressive welfare reform is only statistically 
significant in the unweighted IV model in column (6) with a p-value of 0.006, whereas the weighted IV estimate has 
a p-value of 0.187. 
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year effects, and they are estimated without and with instruments for mother’s participation and 
corrections for misclassification bias. In both the top and bottom panels, we define the daughter’s 
welfare participation as receipt of any AFDC/TANF, food stamps/SNAP, or SSI. However, we 
differentiate the mother’s definition of prior welfare use—maintaining the AFDC/TANF 
definition in the top panel since it is most directly affected by welfare reform, while allowing the 
more general case for any mother’s previous participation in AFDC/TANF, food stamps/SNAP, 
or SSI in the bottom panel. 
[Table 9 here] 
 The top panel in Table 9 shows that IV estimates of the direct effect of mother’s 
AFDC/TANF participation on daughter’s use of the wider safety net was not significantly 
different compared to daughter’s use of AFDC/TANF alone (Table 2) prior to welfare reform. 
However, after welfare reform, there is little evidence that the transmission channel was broken, 
and indeed, across all specifications the transmission mechanism is stronger after reform in terms 
of the baseline probability of participation. Results in the bottom panel condition daughter’s 
wider safety net participation on her mother’s wider safety net history, which shows a weaker 
direct link than AFDC/TANF transmission and a similar pattern as above for post-reform effects 
in that daughters are, if anything, more likely to use the safety net defined broadly.24 
[Figure 4 here] 
A possible explanation for this result is that the economic status of daughters did not 
improve enough after welfare reform relative to their mothers for them to attain self-sufficiency. 
                                                            
24 For misclassification-corrected estimates in Table 9 columns (3) and (4), the reporting rate (1 − ?̂?1𝑡) used in 
estimation is the maximum reporting rate for AFDC/TANF and food stamps/SNAP shown in Appendix Table A1. 
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We explore this possibility in Figure 4 where we present trends in intergenerational correlations 
between mothers and daughters akin to Figure 2, but now for four measures of economic status: 
(1) poverty status defined as an income-to-needs ratio less than 1, where needs is defined by the 
U.S. Census Bureau poverty line that varies by family size; (2) poverty status defined as an 
income-to-needs ratio less than 1.3; (3) poverty status defined as an income-to-needs ratio less 
than 2; and, (4) log family income.25 We present income-to-needs cutoffs of 1.3 and 2 in addition 
to 1 because the Federal guideline for gross income eligibility for food stamps is 130 percent of 
the poverty line, but after the year 2000, states have had the option to extend eligibility and thus 
we also show for a threshold of 200 percent of poverty. In the two decades from the late 1970s to 
1990s, the income mobility of daughters declined (i.e. the correlation was increasing), but then 
stabilized thereafter. This suggests that after welfare reform daughters had continued economic 
need for assistance from the wider safety net. 
VI. Conclusion 
A focal aim of policymakers with the 1990s welfare reform was to end dependence on 
welfare, and based on the metric of the intergenerational transmission between mother and 
daughter, the evidence presented here suggests partial success toward meeting that goal. Viewed 
from the lens of participation in the AFDC/TANF program, we find strong evidence across a 
variety of specifications that address major threats to identification including selection bias, life-
cycle bias, misclassification bias, and geographic mobility, that the level of transmission from 
mother to daughter was reduced by at least 50 percent, and by at least 30 percent over the 
baseline odds of participation. However, when the definition of welfare is expanded from 
                                                            
25 Income-to-needs ratios are constructed as the mean income to mean poverty threshold for a daughter’s adult life 
through age 27, and for the mother’s years while the daughter lives at home. 
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AFDC/TANF to also include food and disability assistance programs, the post-welfare reform 
transmission does not decrease. We suggest that the latter result likely stems from the fact that 
broader economic mobility of daughters stagnated after welfare reform.  
Implicit in the discussion surrounding welfare reform was that the transmission of 
welfare reliance from parent to child was inherently a bad outcome. It is not obvious, however, 
what is the socially efficient intergenerational correlation of welfare outcomes. For example, a 
correlation of zero—perfect mobility with respect to welfare use—would imply that 
accumulating “family capital” (wealth, culture, information, and skills) does nothing to ensure 
the self-sufficiency of future generations. In some cases, though, there may be positive attributes 
to intergenerational transmission of welfare knowledge if take-up rates are low and learning the 
welfare system helps needy recipients (Currie 2006). Indeed, in the few years after welfare 
reform, take-up rates of food stamps among those eligible fell about 20 percentage points to just 
over 50 percent, mainly because potential recipients were not aware of their eligibility in a post-
reform environment that discouraged welfare more generally (Ganong and Leibman 2013; Ziliak 
2015). The policy response by USDA was to grant more authority to states to design their 
programs to improve take up. Presumably, among those 50 percent who continued participation, 
some retained eligibility was because of shared information from parent to child. This suggests a 
need for future theoretical and empirical research on optimal transfer program design that 
incorporates knowledge spillovers across generations. 
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FIGURE 1. TRENDS IN AFDC/TANF, FOOD STAMP/SNAP, AND SSI RECIPIENTS 
 
Notes: Authors’ tabulations of data collected from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, and Social Security Administration. The major waiver period of welfare reform is indicated by the shaded 
region. Abbreviations: Aid to Families with Dependent Children/Temporary Assistance for Needy Families 
(AFDC/TANF), Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), and Supplemental Security Income (SSI).  
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FIGURE 2. TRENDS IN THE INTERGENERATIONAL CORRELATION OF WELFARE PARTICIPATION 
  
Notes: The dependent variable for is an indicator for whether a daughter ever participated in AFDC/TANF (or 
AFDC/TANF, SSI, or Food Stamps) in any year after forming her own family through age 27. The independent variable is 
an indicator for whether the mother ever participated in AFDC/TANF when the child is observed living at home. These 
trends reflect rolling cohort groups of daughters aged 27-42 in each year. The major waiver period of welfare reform is 
indicated by the shaded region. Abbreviations: Aid to Families with Dependent Children/Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families (AFDC/TANF), Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), and Supplemental Security Income (SSI).  
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FIGURE 3. CRITICAL EXPOSURE PERIOD FOR AFDC/TANF TRANSMISSION THROUGH AGE 17 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is daughter’s current AFDC/TANF status, and the independent variables include any 
previous AFDC/TANF participation for the mother, an indicator for after welfare reform, an interaction term for mother’s 
participation after welfare reform, state and year effects, daughter time-varying controls, and instrumental variables 
including the average and maximum of mother’s AFDC/TANF benefit standard and federal/state EITC maximum benefit 
by family size during the daughter’s ages 12-18, and interactions of each with an indicator for welfare reform.  
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FIGURE 4. TRENDS IN INTERGENERATIONAL TRANSMISSION OF POVERTY STATUS AND FAMILY INCOME 
 
Notes: The intergenerational transmission for poverty status represents linear probability model estimates based on 
indicators for whether an individual’s mean family income is equal to or below 100, 130, or 200% of the mean federal 
poverty threshold by age 27, and the intergenerational elasticity of family income is based on a log-log model of a 
daughter’s average income through age 27 and the average of all of her mother’s family income. The major waiver period 
of welfare reform is indicated by the shaded region.  
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TABLE 1. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
A. Daughter’s Characteristics Before Reform After Reform Pooled 
    
Currently Receiving Welfare? (%)    
AFDC/TANF 0.080 0.025 0.044 
  (0.271) (0.157) (0.206) 
AFDC/TANF, Food Stamps/SNAP, SSI 0.132 0.112 0.119 
  (0.338) (0.315) (0.323) 
Years Before/After Welfare Reform (%) 0.348 0.652  
  (0.476) (0.476)  
Age 28.245 38.665 35.041 
  (5.573) (9.009) (9.400) 
Number of Children 1.249 1.191 1.211 
  (1.168) (1.280) (1.243) 
Race    
Black (%) 0.161 0.170 0.167 
  (0.368) (0.375) (0.373) 
White (%) 0.812 0.805 0.807 
  (0.391) (0.396) (0.394) 
Other (%) 0.027 0.025 0.026 
  (0.162) (0.157) (0.159) 
Resides in Same State as Birth (%) 0.759 0.703 0.723 
  (0.428) (0.457) (0.448) 
    
B. Mother’s Characteristics Before Reform After Reform Pooled 
    
Any Previous Welfare? (%)    
AFDC/TANF 0.269 0.067 0.272 
  (0.444) (0.251) (0.445) 
AFDC/TANF, Food Stamps/SNAP, SSI 0.429 0.191 0.435 
  (0.495) (0.393) (0.496) 
Years Before/After Welfare Reform (%) 0.858 0.142  
  (0.158) (0.158)  
Age 42.540 59.340 61.429 
  (8.871) (10.503) (11.426) 
AFDC/TANF Benefit Standard, Average 723.889 393.179 713.117 
  (339.777) (213.517) (341.339) 
AFDC/TANF Benefit Standard, Maximum 900.850 477.023 892.270 
  (369.241) (225.612) (370.140) 
EITC Federal/State Benefit, Average 801.914 3223.785 877.024 
  (726.252) (1412.117) (876.294) 
EITC Federal/State Benefit, Maximum 1209.281 3883.471 1320.374 
  (886.228) (1405.078) (1087.700) 
     
    
Mean Mother-Child Family Observations   14.212 
Mean Daughter-as-Adult Observations   25.100 
    
Total Observations 25323 30744 56067 
    
Notes: Sample averages are weighted by the daughter’s PSID core longitudinal weights for both daughters' and mothers' 
statistics. Further, the pooled statistics for mothers are not a simple weighted average of before/after reform given that 
these data are aggregated by time period. For example, the pooled average for any previous welfare is cumulative over 
pre- and post-reform periods, whereas the pooled average for age represents mother’s age in the daughter’s observation 
year as opposed to prior years of mother’s potential welfare participation as shown in the before/after reform columns. 
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TABLE 2. INTERGENERATIONAL TRANSMISSION OF AFDC/TANF PARTICIPATION 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Mother’s Participation 0.145 0.238 0.236 0.355 
 (0.014) (0.054) (0.022) (0.087) 
 [0.203] [0.364] [0.312] [0.557] 
After Welfare Reform 0.036 0.060 0.047 0.068 
 (0.007) (0.018) (0.014) (0.027) 
 [0.077] [0.139] [0.088] [0.161] 
Mother’s Participation ×  
After Welfare Reform 
-0.101 -0.164 -0.134 -0.181 
(0.015) (0.045) (0.030) (0.071) 
 [-0.159] [-0.260] [-0.202] [-0.313] 
     
Instrumental Variables No Yes No Yes 
Misclassification Correction No No Yes Yes 
     
     
Weak IV Test Statistic   23.157  20.875 
p-value (Weak IV)  0.002  0.004 
Hansen J Statistic  2.548  2.493 
p-value (J Statistic)  0.863  0.869 
     
Percent Change in Levels -70% -69% -57% -51% 
Percent Change over Baseline -47% -45% -40% -32% 
     
Number of Daughters 2961 2961 2961 2961 
Observations 56067 56067 56067 56067 
     
Notes: Weighted estimates are shown with unweighted versions of point estimates below in brackets. Robust standard 
errors with state clustering are shown in parentheses. All specifications control for state and year effects in addition to 
time-varying controls for daughter’s age, age squared, and indicators for number of children equal to 1, 2, 3, or at least 
4. Instrumental variables include the average and maximum of mother’s AFDC/TANF benefit standard and 
federal/state EITC by family size during the critical exposure period of daughter’s ages 12-18, and interactions of each 
with an indicator for welfare reform. The weak IV test statistic is a Kleibergen-Paap (2006) rank statistic. 
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TABLE 3. IV ESTIMATES OF THE INTERGENERATIONAL TRANSMISSION OF AFDC/TANF 
PARTICIPATION BY MINIMUM NUMBER OF MOTHER-DAUGHTER FAMILY OBSERVATIONS, 𝑵𝑭 
 𝑁𝐹 ≥ 1 𝑁𝐹 ≥ 10 𝑁𝐹 ≥ 15 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Mother’s Participation 0.284 0.424 0.296 0.492 0.281 0.462 
 (0.062) (0.104) (0.066) (0.107) (0.063) (0.111) 
 [0.402] [0.584] [0.375] [0.615] [0.393] [0.612] 
After Welfare Reform 0.075 0.091 0.084 0.116 0.086 0.115 
 (0.021) (0.035) (0.024) (0.036) (0.027) (0.045) 
 [0.167] [0.189] [0.145] [0.181] [0.167] [0.198] 
Mother’s Participation × 
After Welfare Reform 
-0.211 -0.253 -0.228 -0.319 -0.191 -0.250 
(0.053) (0.087) (0.059) (0.095) (0.059) (0.105) 
 [-0.329] [-0.392] [-0.267] [-0.350] [-0.296] [-0.370] 
       
Misclassification Correction No Yes No Yes No Yes 
       
       
Weak IV Test Statistic  20.812 18.441 23.667 23.094 16.917 17.672 
p-value (Weak IV) 0.004 0.010 0.001 0.002 0.018 0.014 
Hansen J Statistic 4.284 4.980 5.289 5.166 4.364 4.888 
p-value (J Statistic) 0.638 0.546 0.507 0.523 0.628 0.558 
       
Percent Change in Levels -74% -60% -77% -65% -68% -54% 
Percent Change over Baseline -55% -44% -60% -51% -44% -36% 
       
Number of Daughters 3823 3823 2466 2466 1806 1806 
Observations 74548 74548 43732 43732 28902 28902 
       
Notes: Weighted estimates are shown with unweighted versions of point estimates below in brackets. The minimum 
number of mother-daughter family observations, denoted 𝑁𝐹, represent years when the mother is observed before the 
daughter has formed her own family unit (for estimates in all other tables, 𝑁𝐹 ≥ 5). Robust standard errors with state 
clustering are shown in parentheses. All specifications control for state and year effects in addition to time-varying 
controls for daughter’s age, age squared, and indicators for number of children equal to 1, 2, 3, or at least 4. 
Instrumental variables used in each specification include the average and maximum of mother’s AFDC/TANF benefit 
standard and federal/state EITC by family size during the critical exposure period of daughter’s ages 12-18, and 
interactions of each with an indicator for welfare reform. The weak IV test statistic is a Kleibergen-Paap (2006) rank 
statistic. 
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TABLE 4. INTERGENERATIONAL TRANSMISSION OF AFDC/TANF PARTICIPATION 
WITH LEE-SOLON-TYPE (2009) LIFE-CYCLE ADJUSTMENTS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Mother’s Participation 0.177 0.333 0.257 0.489 
 (0.017) (0.066) (0.025) (0.098) 
 [0.237] [0.431] [0.328] [0.570] 
After Welfare Reform 0.018 0.040 0.022 0.037 
 (0.007) (0.014) (0.013) (0.024) 
 [0.037] [0.118] [0.041] [0.196] 
Mother’s Participation ×  
After Welfare Reform 
-0.117 -0.159 -0.126 -0.177 
(0.024) (0.049) (0.044) (0.079) 
 [-0.171] [-0.279] [-0.184] [-0.386] 
     
Instrumental Variables No Yes No Yes 
Misclassification Correction No No Yes Yes 
     
     
Weak IV Test Statistic   26.617  23.252 
p-value (Weak IV)  0.032  0.079 
Hansen J Statistic  19.595  17.378 
p-value (J Statistic)  0.143  0.237 
     
Percent Change in Levels -66% -48% -49% -36% 
Percent Change over Baseline -40% -8% -29% -11% 
     
Number of Daughters 2961 2961 2961 2961 
Observations 56067 56067 56067 56067 
     
Notes: Weighted estimates are shown with unweighted versions of point estimates below in brackets. Robust standard 
errors with state clustering are shown in parentheses. Lee-Solon-type control variables are used in each specification: a 
quartic on mother’s mean age during prior years of potential welfare participation, a quartic on daughter’s current age 
detrended by 25 (current age – 25), and mother’s participation indicator interacted with the quartic on daughter’s age. 
All specifications control for state and year effects in addition to time-varying indicators for daughter’s number of 
children equal to 1, 2, 3, or at least 4. Instrumental variables include the average and maximum of mother’s 
AFDC/TANF benefit standard and federal/state EITC by family size during the critical exposure period of daughter’s 
ages 12-18, and interactions of each with an indicator for welfare reform. Further instrumental variables accounting for 
age adjustments include interactions of each instrument above measured by averages (not maximums) with a quartic in 
daughter’s detrended age. The weak IV test statistic is a Kleibergen-Paap (2006) rank statistic. 
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TABLE 5. IV ESTIMATES OF INTERGENERATIONAL TRANSMISSION OF AFDC/TANF 
PARTICIPATION BY DAUGHTER’S GEOGRAPHIC MOBILITY STATUS 
 Same State as Birth Same State as Mother Never Moves States 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Mother’s Participation 0.279 0.443 0.363 0.506 0.373 0.580 
 (0.072) (0.123) (0.081) (0.131) (0.089) (0.141) 
 [0.415] [0.641] [0.498] [0.706] [0.476] [0.736] 
After Welfare Reform 0.069 0.081 0.074 0.079 0.098 0.122 
 (0.025) (0.041) (0.019) (0.034) (0.037) (0.057) 
 [0.155] [0.170] [0.161] [0.182] [0.186] [0.216] 
Mother’s Participation × 
After Welfare Reform 
-0.191 -0.208 -0.249 -0.254 -0.274 -0.320 
(0.063) (0.104) (0.068) (0.114) (0.083) (0.126) 
 [-0.281] [-0.319] [-0.343] [-0.373] [-0.347] [-0.417] 
       
Misclassification Correction No Yes No Yes No Yes 
       
       
Weak IV Test Statistic  18.593 18.153 18.683 17.286 12.985 13.173 
p-value (Weak IV) 0.010 0.011 0.009 0.016 0.073 0.068 
Hansen J Statistic 4.031 3.389 3.297 3.074 3.903 3.942 
p-value (J Statistic) 0.673 0.759 0.771 0.799 0.690 0.685 
       
Percent Change in Levels -68% -47% -69% -50% -73% -55% 
Percent Change over Baseline -44% -26% -45% -31% -53% -38% 
       
Number of Daughters 2617 2617 2757 2757 1960 1960 
Observations 44114 44114 36818 36818 36396 36396 
       
Notes: Weighted estimates are shown with unweighted versions of point estimates below in brackets. Robust standard 
errors with state clustering are shown in parentheses. All specifications control for state and year effects in addition to 
time-varying controls for daughter’s age, age squared, and indicators for number of children equal to 1, 2, 3, or at least 
4. Instrumental variables used in each specification include the average and maximum of mother’s AFDC/TANF 
benefit standard and federal/state EITC by family size during the critical exposure period of daughter’s ages 12-18, and 
interactions of each with an indicator for welfare reform. The weak IV test statistic is a Kleibergen-Paap (2006) rank 
statistic. 
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TABLE 6. INTERGENERATIONAL TRANSMISSION OF AFDC/TANF PARTICIPATION 
BY EXPOSURE MECHANISM VIA “WORD OF MOUTH” 
 
 
Exposure During  
Co-Residence Only 
Any Prior Exposure with  
Daughter Fixed Effects and 
“Word-of-Mouth” Learning 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Mother’s Participation 0.252 0.381 0.079 0.217 -0.143 
 (0.047) (0.076) (0.023) (0.032) (0.364) 
 [0.408] [0.617] [0.119] [0.281] [0.142] 
After Welfare Reform 0.053 0.061 0.052 0.072 0.168 
 (0.017) (0.028) (0.011) (0.020) (0.047) 
 [0.121] [0.129] [0.106] [0.137] [0.214] 
Mother’s Participation × 
After Welfare Reform 
-0.171 -0.185 -0.128 -0.176 -0.511 
(0.054) (0.093) (0.019) (0.034) (0.128) 
 [-0.266] [-0.288] [-0.162] [-0.210] [-0.380] 
      
Daughter Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes 
Instrumental Variables Yes Yes No No Yes 
Misclassification Correction No Yes No Yes Yes 
      
      
Weak IV Test Statistic  17.908 17.780   20.387 
p-value (Weak IV) 0.012 0.013   0.005 
Hansen J Statistic 5.387 5.114   11.896 
p-value (J Statistic) 0.495 0.529   0.064 
      
Percent Change in Levels -68% -49% -100% -81% - 
Percent Change over Baseline -43% -28% - -74% - 
      
Number of Daughters 2961 2961 2961 2961 2961 
Observations 56067 56067 56067 56067 56067 
      
Notes: Weighted estimates are shown with unweighted versions of point estimates below in brackets. Robust standard 
errors with state clustering are shown in parentheses. All specifications control for state and year effects in addition to 
time-varying controls for daughter’s age, age squared, and indicators for number of children equal to 1, 2, 3, or at least 
4. Instrumental variables include the average and maximum of mother’s AFDC/TANF benefit standard and federal/ 
state EITC by family size during years of co-residence for columns (1)-(2) or during any prior year up to a 5-year lag 
for column (4), and interactions of each with an indicator for welfare reform. The weak IV test statistic is a Kleibergen-
Paap (2006) rank statistic. 
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TABLE 7. INTERGENERATIONAL TRANSMISSION OF AFDC/TANF PARTICIPATION 
BY DURATION OF MOTHER’S PARTICIPATION IN YEARS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Mother’s Participation,  
At Most 2 Years 
0.112 0.123 0.175 0.139 
(0.026) (0.169) (0.043) (0.282) 
 [0.157] [0.109] [0.240] [0.155] 
Mother’s Participation,  
More than 2 Years 
0.195 0.279 0.320 0.414 
(0.028) (0.099) (0.046) (0.153) 
 [0.235] [0.461] [0.363] [0.674] 
After Welfare Reform 0.028 0.037 0.034 0.033 
(0.008) (0.015) (0.015) (0.024) 
 [0.049] [0.090] [0.047] [0.093] 
Participation At Most 2 Years ×  
After Welfare Reform 
-0.063 -0.057 -0.066 0.053 
(0.030) (0.187) (0.055) (0.324) 
 [-0.114] [-0.122] [-0.139] [-0.134] 
Participation More than 2 Years ×  
After Welfare Reform 
-0.116 -0.167 -0.140 -0.181 
(0.025) (0.104) (0.044) (0.180) 
 [-0.155] [-0.305] [-0.174] [-0.332] 
     
Instrumental Variables No Yes No Yes 
Misclassification Correction No No Yes Yes 
     
     
Weak IV Test Statistic   26.671  26.652 
p-value (Weak IV)  0.372  0.373 
Hansen J Statistic  17.150  16.543 
p-value (J Statistic)  0.842  0.868 
     
 Mother’s Participation, At Most 2 Years 
Percent Change in Levels -56% -46% -38% 38% 
Percent Change over Baseline -23% -6% -13% 92% 
 Mother’s Participation, More than 2 Years 
Percent Change in Levels -59% -60% -44% -44% 
Percent Change over Baseline -29% -29% -22% -22% 
     
Number of Daughters 2961 2961 2961 2961 
Observations 56067 56067 56067 56067 
     
Notes: Weighted estimates are shown with unweighted versions of point estimates below in brackets. Robust standard 
errors with state clustering are shown in parentheses. All specifications control for state and year effects in addition to 
time-varying controls for daughter’s age, age squared, and indicators for number of children equal to 1, 2, 3, or at least 
4. Instrumental variables include the average and maximum of mother’s AFDC/TANF benefit standard and 
federal/state EITC by family size during the critical exposure period of daughter’s ages 12-18, interactions of each with 
an indicator for welfare reform, and interactions between each mother IV and between each reform-mother IV. The 
weak IV test statistic is a Kleibergen-Paap (2006) rank statistic.  
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TABLE 8. HETEROGENEOUS INTERGENERATIONAL TRANSMISSION OF  
AFDC/TANF PARTICIPATION 
TRANSMISSION EFFECTS BY: RACE STATE REFORM AGGRESSIVENESS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Black Aggressive States 
Mother’s Participation 0.166 0.059 0.408 0.139 0.098 0.153 
 (0.027) (0.040) (0.166) (0.016) (0.031) (0.035) 
 [0.192] [0.120] [0.849] [0.174] [0.112] [0.211] 
Mother’s Participation × 
After Welfare Reform 
-0.101 -0.190 -0.181 -0.100 -0.128 -0.118 
(0.032) (0.035) (0.186) (0.022) (0.014) (0.032) 
 [-0.156] [-0.187] [-0.703] [-0.144] [-0.148] [-0.174] 
 White Non-Aggressive States 
Mother’s Participation 0.068 0.030 0.089 0.148 0.071 0.256 
 (0.013) (0.033) (0.057) (0.018) (0.032) (0.075) 
 [0.086] [0.053] [0.166] [0.217] [0.123] [0.449] 
Mother’s Participation × 
After Welfare Reform 
-0.057 -0.044 -0.081 -0.101 -0.127 -0.186 
(0.014) (0.022) (0.059) (0.018) (0.024) (0.063) 
 [-0.081] [-0.040] [-0.243] [-0.169] [-0.169] [-0.341] 
       
Daughter Fixed Effects No Yes No No Yes No 
Instrumental Variables No No Yes No No Yes 
       
     
Weak IV Test Statistic    23.240   27.817 
p-value (Weak IV)   0.039   0.010 
Hansen J Statistic   11.358   8.856 
p-value (J Statistic)   0.498   0.715 
       
 Black Aggressive 
Percent Change in Levels -61% -100% -44% -72% -100% -77% 
Percent Change over Baseline -31% - -2% -51% - -60% 
 White Non-Aggressive 
Percent Change in Levels -84% -100% -91% -68% -100% -73% 
Percent Change over Baseline -72% - -84% -44% - -52% 
      
Number of Daughters 2849 2849 2849 2961 2961 2961 
Observations 54963 54963 54963 56067 56067 56067 
       
Notes: Weighted estimates are shown with unweighted versions of point estimates below in brackets. Robust standard 
errors with state clustering are shown in parentheses. All specifications control for state and year effects in addition to 
time-varying controls for daughter’s age, age squared, and indicators for number of children equal to 1, 2, 3, or at least 
4. Instrumental variables used in each specification include the average and maximum of mother’s AFDC/TANF 
benefit standard and federal/state EITC by family size during the critical exposure period of daughter’s ages 12-18, 
interactions of each with an indicator for welfare reform, and all interacted with an indicator for daughter’s race is black 
in the top panel or an indicator for aggressive welfare reform in the bottom panel. The weak IV test statistic is a 
Kleibergen-Paap (2006) rank statistic. 
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TABLE 9. INTERGENERATIONAL TRANSMISSION OF AFDC/TANF, FOOD STAMPS/SNAP, AND 
SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY INCOME PARTICIPATION 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
A. Effect of Mother’s AFDC/TANF on Daughter’s AFDC/TANF, SNAP, SSI 
     
Mother’s Participation 0.226 0.215 0.293 0.259 
 (0.019) (0.068) (0.024) (0.089) 
 [0.270] [0.407] [0.346] [0.504] 
After Welfare Reform 0.002 -0.033 -0.011 -0.072 
 (0.013) (0.030) (0.020) (0.042) 
 [0.020] [0.026] [-0.007] [-0.026] 
Mother’s Participation × 
After Welfare Reform 
-0.044 0.099 -0.020 0.217 
(0.021) (0.077) (0.030) (0.106) 
 [-0.052] [-0.027] [-0.013] [0.080] 
     
Instrumental Variables No Yes No Yes 
Misclassification Correction No No Yes Yes 
     
Weak IV Test Statistic   23.157  21.646 
p-value (Weak IV)  0.002  0.003 
Hansen J Statistic  10.657  10.078 
p-value (J Statistic)  0.100  0.121 
     
Percent Change in Levels -19% 46% -7% 84% 
Percent Change over Baseline 42% 157% 30% 156% 
     
B. Effect of Mother’s AFDC/TANF, SNAP, SSI on Daughter’s AFDC/TANF, SNAP, SSI 
     
Mother’s Participation 0.160 0.161 0.207 0.179 
 (0.012) (0.048) (0.016) (0.062) 
 [0.211] [0.418] [0.267] [0.505] 
After Welfare Reform -0.009 -0.075 -0.031 -0.152 
 (0.014) (0.033) (0.022) (0.047) 
 [0.002] [-0.020] [-0.038] [-0.114] 
Mother’s Participation × 
After Welfare Reform 
-0.014 0.151 0.014 0.307 
(0.015) (0.058) (0.022) (0.081) 
 [-0.027] [0.048] [0.017] [0.192] 
     
Instrumental Variables No Yes No Yes 
Misclassification Correction No No Yes Yes 
     
Weak IV Test Statistic   19.487  16.439 
p-value (Weak IV)  0.192  0.126 
Hansen J Statistic  15.938  11.638 
p-value (J Statistic)  0.317  0.310 
     
Percent Change in Levels -9% 94% 7% 172% 
Percent Change over Baseline 61% 241% 49% 278% 
     
     
Number of Daughters 2961 2961 2961 2961 
Observations 56067 56067 56067 56067 
     
Notes: Weighted estimates are shown with unweighted versions of point estimates below in brackets. Robust standard 
errors with state clustering are shown in parentheses. All specifications control for state and year effects in addition to 
time-varying controls for daughter’s age, age squared, and indicators for number of children equal to 1, 2, 3, or at least 
4. Instrumental variables include the average and maximum of mother’s AFDC/TANF benefit standard and 
federal/state EITC (as well as Food Stamps/SNAP maximum value for Panel B) by family size during the critical 
exposure period of daughter’s ages 12-18, and interactions of each with an indicator for welfare reform. The weak IV 
test statistic is a Kleibergen-Paap (2006) rank statistic. Abbreviations: Food Stamps/Supplemental Nutrition Assistance 
Program (SNAP) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI).  
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Appendix A. Notes on Misclassification Bias Corrections 
Estimates based on equation (1) rely on self-reported data for a daughter’s welfare 
participation at time 𝑡 and her mother’s self-reported participation at any time prior to 𝑡, 
𝑊𝑖𝑠𝑡
𝑑 = 𝛼 + 𝛽′𝒙𝑖𝑠𝑡
𝑑 + 𝛿𝑊𝑖𝑠,∀𝑗<𝑡
𝑚 + 𝛾𝑅𝑠𝑡
𝑚 + 𝜃𝑅𝑠𝑡
𝑚𝑊𝑖𝑠,∀𝑗<𝑡
𝑚 + 𝜇𝑠
𝑑 + 𝜌𝑡
𝑑 + 𝜈𝑖𝑠𝑡
𝑑 , 
where 𝑊𝑖𝑠,∀𝑗<𝑡
𝑚 = max{𝑊𝑖𝑠,𝑡−1
𝑚 , 𝑊𝑖𝑠,𝑡−2
𝑚 , 𝑊𝑖𝑠,𝑡−3
𝑚 , … }. Let the true participation status be denoted 
?̃?𝑖𝑠𝑡
𝑑  for daughter at time 𝑡, ?̃?𝑖𝑠𝑡
𝑚  for mother at time 𝑡, and ?̃?𝑖𝑠,∀𝑗<𝑡
𝑚  for mother at any time prior to 
time 𝑡. In principle, both 𝑊𝑖𝑠𝑡
𝑑  and 𝑊𝑖𝑠𝑡
𝑚  can be affected by misclassification error. However, as 
demonstrated below, 𝑊𝑖𝑠,∀𝑗<𝑡
𝑚  does not represent a challenge for point estimation as long as 
individuals have some positive probability of truthfully reporting welfare participation at time 𝑡. 
To fix ideas, consider for simplicity 𝑡 = 3 with 𝑗 ∈ {1,2} and let the probability of 
truthfully reporting participation be defined as 𝑞 = P(𝑊𝑖𝑠𝑡
𝑚 = 1|?̃?𝑖𝑠𝑡
𝑚 = 1) > 0. In this case, the 
mother’s measure of any prior participation at 𝑡 = 3 will be accurately reported with probability 
P(𝑊𝑖𝑠,∀𝑗<3
𝑚 = 1|?̃?𝑖𝑠,∀𝑗<3
𝑚 = 1) = 
P(𝑊𝑖𝑠1
𝑚 = 1|?̃?𝑖𝑠1
𝑚 = 1) + P(𝑊𝑖𝑠2
𝑚 = 1|?̃?𝑖𝑠2
𝑚 = 1) 
−P(𝑊𝑖𝑠1
𝑚 = 1|?̃?𝑖𝑠1
𝑚 = 1)P(𝑊𝑖𝑠2
𝑚 = 1|?̃?𝑖𝑠2
𝑚 = 1, 𝑊𝑖𝑠1
𝑚 = 1, ?̃?𝑖𝑠1
𝑚 = 1). 
Denoting P(𝑊𝑖𝑠2
𝑚 = 1|?̃?𝑖𝑠2
𝑚 = 1, 𝑊𝑖𝑠1
𝑚 = 1, ?̃?𝑖𝑠1
𝑚 = 1) = 𝑟, it follows that, 
P(𝑊𝑖𝑠,∀𝑗<3
𝑚 = 1|?̃?𝑖𝑠,∀𝑗<3
𝑚 = 1) =  𝑞 (2 − 𝑟) > 𝑞 = P(𝑊𝑖𝑠3
𝑚 = 1|?̃?𝑖𝑠3
𝑚 = 1). 
We can now generalize the argument assuming, again for simplicity in exposition, that 𝑞 = 𝑟. 
The probability of ever truthfully reported welfare participation under the above conditions can 
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be expressed (based on the inclusion-exclusion principle for the union of finite events 
(Billingsley 1995, p. 24)) as  
𝑄𝑡(𝑞) ≡ P(𝑊𝑖𝑠,∀𝑗<𝑡
𝑚 = 1|?̃?𝑖𝑠,∀𝑗<𝑡
𝑚 = 1) = ∑(−1)𝑗−1 (
𝑡 − 1
𝑗
) 𝑞𝑗
𝑡−1
𝑗=1
, where (
𝑡 − 1
𝑗
) =
(𝑡 − 1)!
𝑗! (𝑡 − 1 − 𝑗)!
, 
which is increasing in the number of time periods observed. For our analysis, the mother’s 
minimum number of time periods is five years, and for the average reporting rate for 1970-2000 
(see Table A1 and Meyer et al. 2015b), the probability is 𝑄5(𝑞 = 0.668) ≈ 0.996, or for the 
minimum reporting rate over that time period, 𝑄5(𝑞 = 0.318) ≈ 0.852. Given that mothers are 
observed for about 14 years on average prior to the daughter’s participation decision, the 
probability that a mother truthfully reports any prior participation tends to 1, as shown in the 
graph below.  
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 We focus instead on misclassification in the binary dependent variable for daughter’s 
current welfare status. The probability that a daughter reports participating in welfare can be 
written as 
P(𝑊𝑖𝑠𝑡
𝑑 = 1) = P(𝑊𝑖𝑠𝑡
𝑑 = 1|?̃?𝑖𝑠𝑡
𝑑 = 1) P(?̃?𝑖𝑠𝑡
𝑑 = 1) + P(𝑊𝑖𝑠𝑡
𝑑 = 1|?̃?𝑖𝑠𝑡
𝑑 = 0) P(?̃?𝑖𝑠𝑡
𝑑 = 0), 
where false negatives are defined as 𝜏1,𝑖𝑠𝑡 ≔ P(𝑊𝑖𝑠𝑡
𝑑 = 0|?̃?𝑖𝑠𝑡
𝑑 = 1) and false positives are 
defined as 𝜏0,𝑖𝑠𝑡 ≔ P(𝑊𝑖𝑠𝑡
𝑑 = 1|?̃?𝑖𝑠𝑡
𝑑 = 0) = 0 by assumption.26 This assumption is standard in 
the literature as false positive reports are relatively small, and these misreports typically 
correspond to individuals who mistake the source or timing of actual welfare participation. 
Therefore, using equation (1) and 𝜏1,𝑖𝑠𝑡, we can rewrite the daughter’s probability of 
reported welfare participation as  
P(𝑊𝑖𝑠𝑡
𝑑 = 1) = [1 − τ1,𝑖𝑠𝑡][𝛼 + 𝛽
′𝒙𝑖𝑠𝑡
𝑑 + 𝛿𝑊𝑖𝑠,∀𝑗<𝑡
𝑚 + 𝛾𝑅𝑠𝑡
𝑚 + 𝜃𝑅𝑠𝑡
𝑚𝑊𝑖𝑠,∀𝑗<𝑡
𝑚 + 𝜇𝑠
𝑑 + 𝜌𝑡
𝑑 + 𝜈𝑖𝑠𝑡
𝑑 ]. 
We estimate the previous equation in two steps. The first step estimates misclassification 
probabilities based on estimates of AFDC/TANF reporting rates in the PSID by Meyer, Mok, 
and Sullivan (2015b) considering that E(τ1,𝑖𝑠𝑡) = 𝜏1𝑡. Table A1 shows the reporting rates used in 
estimation. In the second stage, we estimate the parameter of interest, (𝛿, 𝛾, 𝜃), by estimating the 
model of 𝑊𝑖𝑠𝑡
𝑑  on weighted independent variables including a weighted intercept [1 − ?̂?1𝑡]𝛼, 
[1 − ?̂?1𝑡]𝜇𝑠
𝑑 and [1 − ?̂?1𝑡]𝜌𝑡
𝑑.  
                                                            
26 Note that whereas 𝑞 is assumed fixed for the purposes of exposition above, false negatives here can be shown 
equivalently as 𝜏1,𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 1 − 𝑞𝑖𝑠𝑡. 
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TABLE A1. PSID REPORTING RATES TAKEN AS GIVEN  
FOR MISCLASSIFICATION BIAS CORRECTION ESTIMATES 
 AFDC/TANF Food Stamps/SNAP 
 Meyer, et al. (2015b) 
Estimation 
Parameter 
Meyer, et al. (2015b) 
Estimation 
Parameter Year Transfers Cases Transfers Cases 
1975 0.646  0.722 0.779  0.773 
1976 0.662  0.740 0.734  0.728 
1977 0.630  0.704 0.754  0.748 
1978 0.661  0.739 0.772  0.766 
1979 0.642  0.717 0.782  0.776 
1980 0.700  0.782 0.761 0.782 0.755 
1981 0.699  0.781 0.761 0.780 0.755 
1982 0.679  0.759 0.832 0.841 0.826 
1983 0.708  0.791 0.808 0.817 0.802 
1984 0.631  0.705 0.830 0.784 0.824 
1985 0.594  0.664 0.817 0.786 0.811 
1986 0.587  0.656 0.818 0.841 0.812 
1987 0.555  0.620 0.871 0.846 0.864 
1988 0.620  0.693 0.862 0.847 0.855 
1989 0.576  0.644 0.982 0.845 0.974 
1990 0.586  0.655 0.857 0.770 0.850 
1991 0.612  0.684 0.756 0.681 0.750 
1992 0.600  0.671 0.731 0.720 0.725 
1993 0.528 0.605 0.590 0.621 0.700 0.616 
1994 0.474 0.569 0.530 0.662 0.686 0.657 
1995 0.493 0.539 0.551 0.632 0.652 0.627 
1996 0.541 0.572 0.605 0.572 0.604 0.568 
1997   0.508 0.509 0.522 0.505 
1998 0.369 0.403 0.412 0.563 0.561 0.559 
1999   0.387 0.654 0.535 0.649 
2000 0.323 0.445 0.361 0.617 0.583 0.612 
2001   0.350 0.592 0.573 0.587 
2002 0.303 0.343 0.339 0.744 0.595 0.738 
2003 0.387 0.458 0.432 0.685 0.719 0.680 
2004 0.487 0.510 0.544 0.718 0.807 0.712 
2005 0.285 0.285 0.318 0.688 0.635 0.683 
2006 0.395 0.365 0.441 0.693 0.758 0.688 
2007   0.472 0.742 0.794 0.736 
2008 0.450 0.497 0.503 0.777 0.791 0.771 
2009   0.486 0.704 0.764 0.699 
2010 0.419 0.504 0.468 0.648 0.713 0.643 
2011   0.477   0.671 
2012   0.473   0.657 
Notes: PSID reporting rates for dollar amount in transfers and number of cases for AFDC/TANF and food 
stamps/SNAP are estimated in Meyer, et al. (2015b). The estimation parameter used in misclassification bias 
correction estimates, (1 − ?̂?1𝑡), is the imputed reporting rate. The imputed rate is equal to the reporting rate for 
transfers in the first column inflated by the average ratio of the reporting rates for transfers and cases given the years 
with available data, which is approximately 1.118 for AFDC/TANF and 0.992 for food stamps/SNAP. In years 
where we are missing both rates for amounts and cases, we linearly interpolate between observed years and use a 
two-year moving average for the last years. 
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Appendix B. Additional Results and Robustness Checks 
As referenced throughout the paper, the following section introduces various tables with 
additional results that explore the sensitivity of our main findings. The qualitative results of 
welfare reform are consistent: there is a causal influence from mother’s welfare participation, 
and reform attenuates this transmission by more than 50 percent in levels and more than 30 
percent above baseline probabilities given the mechanical change in participation after reform. 
In Table B1, we compare estimates for different sets of instrumental variables, which are 
key to identifying the effect of mother’s participation given her selection into welfare. Then, in 
Table B2 we re-estimate the baseline IV model including mother’s variables related to her 
lifetime earnings ability: log of average family income, educational attainment in years, and both 
income and education (measured when the daughter is aged 12-18). Next, we re-estimate the 
baseline specifications from Table 2 for only the Survey Research Center (SRC) subsample of 
the PSID in Table B3. This PSID subsample is nationally representative without the 
oversampling of low-income and minority families in the Survey of Economic Opportunity 
(SEO) subsample. Lastly, in Table B4 we re-estimate the baseline results in Table 2 for a sample 
of eldest daughters only. Eldest daughters have the most opportunity to continue learning from 
their mothers’ participation after leaving home since there may still be younger siblings living 
with the mother, and this sample abstracts away from larger families being overrepresented in 
the data.  
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TABLE B1. INTERGENERATIONAL TRANSMISSION OF AFDC/TANF PARTICIPATION WITH 
ALTERNATIVE INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Mother’s Participation 0.213 0.278 0.279 0.322 0.419 0.426 
 (0.052) (0.056) (0.056) (0.087) (0.087) (0.088) 
 [0.339] [0.371] [0.379] [0.534] [0.569] [0.581] 
After Welfare Reform 0.048 0.073 0.074 0.051 0.087 0.091 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.027) (0.022) (0.024) 
 [0.119] [0.138] [0.146] [0.139] [0.156] [0.168] 
Mother’s Participation × 
After Welfare Reform 
-0.125 -0.201 -0.204 -0.122 -0.236 -0.251 
(0.043) (0.041) (0.045) (0.074) (0.056) (0.064) 
 [-0.218] [-0.254] [-0.271] [-0.265] [-0.297] [-0.323] 
       
Misclassification Correction No No No Yes Yes Yes 
       
Instrumental Variables:       
AFDC/TANF  X X X X X X 
EITC    X   X 
Unemployment   X X  X X 
       
       
Weak IV Test Statistic  22.275 25.949 26.560 20.349 25.285 25.941 
p-value (Weak IV) 0.000 0.001 0.005 0.000 0.001 0.007 
Hansen J Statistic 1.175 3.748 4.083 0.995 3.872 4.692 
p-value (J Statistic) 0.556 0.711 0.944 0.608 0.694 0.911 
       
Percent Change in Levels -59% -72% -73% -38% -56% -59% 
Percent Change over Baseline -27% -51% -53% -13% -39% -43% 
       
Number of Daughters 2961 2961 2961 2961 2961 2961 
Observations 56067 56067 56067 56067 56067 56067 
       
Notes: Weighted estimates are shown with unweighted versions of point estimates below in brackets. Robust standard 
errors with state clustering are shown in parentheses. All specifications control for state, and year effects in addition to 
time-varying controls for daughter’s age, age squared, and indicators for number of children equal to 1, 2, 3, or at least 
4, and for mother’s log of mean income and mean educational attainment for prior years. Instrumental variables include 
both the average and maximum of each variable listed above, along with interactions of each with an indicator for 
welfare reform, measured during the critical exposure period of daughter’s ages 12-18. The weak IV test statistic is a 
Kleibergen-Paap (2006) rank statistic. 
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TABLE B2. IV ESTIMATES OF INTERGENERATIONAL TRANSMISSION OF AFDC/TANF 
PARTICIPATION WITH CONTROLS FOR MOTHER’S CHARACTERISTICS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Mother’s Participation 0.242 0.232 0.242 0.374 0.337 0.367 
 (0.050) (0.055) (0.057) (0.077) (0.087) (0.089) 
 [0.352] [0.421] [0.393] [0.532] [0.640] [0.590] 
After Welfare Reform 0.058 0.058 0.058 0.069 0.065 0.069 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.025) (0.023) (0.025) 
 [0.125] [0.139] [0.127] [0.141] [0.157] [0.142] 
Mother’s Participation × 
After Welfare Reform 
-0.156 -0.159 -0.160 -0.179 -0.174 -0.184 
(0.041) (0.042) (0.044) (0.067) (0.064) (0.070) 
 [-0.231] [-0.258] [-0.235] [-0.269] [-0.304] [-0.273] 
       
Misclassification Correction No No No Yes Yes Yes 
       
Mother Controls Averaged over Daughter’s Critical Exposure Years: 
Educational Attainment Yes No Yes Yes No Yes 
Log Family Income No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
       
       
Weak IV Test Statistic  22.794 22.329 23.621 23.447 21.052 23.661 
p-value (Weak IV) 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.001 
Hansen J Statistic 2.267 2.485 2.429 2.323 2.353 2.481 
p-value (J Statistic) 0.894 0.870 0.876 0.888 0.885 0.871 
       
Percent Change in Levels -64% -69% -66% -48% -52% -50% 
Percent Change over Baseline -37% -45% -40% -27% -33% -31% 
       
Number of Daughters 2946 2946 2946 2946 2946 2946 
Observations 55945 55945 55945 55945 55945 55945 
       
Notes: Weighted estimates are shown with unweighted versions of point estimates below in brackets. Robust standard 
errors with state clustering are shown in parentheses. All specifications control for state and year effects in addition to 
time-varying controls for daughter’s age, age squared, and indicators for number of children equal to 1, 2, 3, or at least 
4. Instrumental variables used in each specification include the average and maximum of mother’s AFDC/TANF 
benefit standard and federal/state EITC by family size during the critical exposure period of daughter’s ages 12-18, and 
interactions of each with an indicator for welfare reform. The weak IV test statistic is a Kleibergen-Paap (2006) rank 
statistic. 
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TABLE B3. INTERGENERATIONAL TRANSMISSION OF AFDC/TANF PARTICIPATION FOR THE 
SURVEY RESEARCH CENTER (SRC) SAMPLE ONLY 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Mother’s Participation 0.092 0.122 0.153 0.167 
 (0.018) (0.044) (0.032) (0.071) 
 [0.114] [0.164] [0.181] [0.202] 
After Welfare Reform 0.021 0.029 0.029 0.033 
 (0.008) (0.015) (0.016) (0.025) 
 [0.029] [0.043] [0.043] [0.048] 
Mother’s Participation ×  
After Welfare Reform 
-0.060 -0.092 -0.081 -0.095 
(0.019) (0.051) (0.036) (0.091) 
 [-0.089] [-0.142] [-0.121] [-0.138] 
     
Instrumental Variables No Yes No Yes 
Misclassification Correction No No Yes Yes 
     
     
Weak IV Test Statistic   19.845  17.338 
p-value (Weak IV)  0.006  0.015 
Hansen J Statistic  5.766  5.632 
p-value (J Statistic)  0.450  0.466 
     
Percent Change in Levels -65% -75% -53% -57% 
Percent Change over Baseline -39% -57% -34% -40% 
     
Number of Daughters 1422 1422 1422 1422 
Observations 28917 28917 28917 28917 
     
Notes: Weighted estimates are shown with unweighted versions of point estimates below in brackets. Robust standard 
errors with state clustering are shown in parentheses. All specifications control for state and year effects in addition to 
time-varying controls for daughter’s age, age squared, and indicators for number of children equal to 1, 2, 3, or at least 
4. Instrumental variables include the average and maximum of mother’s AFDC/TANF benefit standard and 
federal/state EITC by family size during the critical exposure period of daughter’s ages 12-18, and interactions of each 
with an indicator for welfare reform. The weak IV test statistic is a Kleibergen-Paap (2006) rank statistic. 
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TABLE B4. INTERGENERATIONAL TRANSMISSION OF AFDC/TANF 
PARTICIPATION FOR THE SUBSAMPLE OF ELDEST DAUGHTERS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Mother’s Participation 0.137 0.220 0.219 0.306 
 (0.014) (0.078) (0.022) (0.135) 
 [0.197] [0.364] [0.301] [0.548] 
After Welfare Reform 0.031 0.049 0.037 0.045 
 (0.007) (0.023) (0.013) (0.037) 
 [0.071] [0.134] [0.081] [0.152] 
Mother’s Participation ×  
After Welfare Reform 
-0.099 -0.150 -0.135 -0.144 
(0.017) (0.066) (0.030) (0.113) 
 [-0.157] [-0.274] [-0.201] [-0.324] 
     
Instrumental Variables No Yes No Yes 
Misclassification Correction No No Yes Yes 
     
     
Weak IV Test Statistic   21.298  18.619 
p-value (Weak IV)  0.003  0.009 
Hansen J Statistic  2.616  2.672 
p-value (J Statistic)  0.855  0.849 
     
Percent Change in Levels -72% -68% -62% -47% 
Percent Change over Baseline -51% -44% -47% -26% 
     
Number of Daughters 1914 1914 1914 1914 
Observations 36287 36287 36287 36287 
     
Notes: Weighted estimates are shown with unweighted versions of point estimates below in brackets. Robust standard 
errors with state clustering are shown in parentheses. All specifications control for state and year effects in addition to 
time-varying controls for daughter’s age, age squared, and indicators for number of children equal to 1, 2, 3, or at least 
4. Instrumental variables include the average and maximum of mother’s AFDC/TANF benefit standard and 
federal/state EITC by family size during the critical exposure period of daughter’s ages 12-18, and interactions of each 
with an indicator for welfare reform. The weak IV test statistic is a Kleibergen-Paap (2006) rank statistic. 
 
 
 
